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Abstract
Vital to the discussion around special education is the topic of identification and de-identification
as having a disability that impacts one’s education. Variation in special education enrollment
across geographic locations, racial groups, and schooling sectors causes researchers to question
the process and incentives involved in identification and de-identification. The studies that
comprise this dissertation aim to analyze the effects that educational policies have on special
education identification and subsequent enrollment. Specifically, the studies cover the special
education finance, school accountability, and school choice policies.
The special education finance reform effort of switching from a prospective to a
capitation funding system over the last 20 years provides the opportunity to employ an event
study framework to determine the average effect of these policy changes on special education
enrollment. Building on prior research on this topic, this study analyzes data from all 50 states
and D.C. on special education enrollment and school resources from 1991-2013. In
implementing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), states had flexibility to determine
the minimum size of subgroups to provide statistical reliability along with accountability for as
many schools as possible. If a school’s enrollment of a subgroup did not meet the state’s
minimum subgroup size, the proficiency of the students in the group was not calculated as part of
AYP. For this reason, we anticipate seeing a cliff in which rates of students with disabilities
drop significantly at the cutoff, demonstrating a school’s response to accountability incentives.
We use data from over 1,000 Arkansas schools for the years 2004-05 to 2013-14 in a schoollevel fixed effects analyses to show how falling below the minimum subgroup cutoff of 40 is
associated with a decrease in students with disabilities at a school. Lastly, we conduct the first
experimental analysis of the impact of enrollment in a private school choice program on special
education identification and de-identification. Using data for almost 2,000 students who were

randomly assigned to private schools in the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP), we analyze
the local average treatment effects of the program on the probability of a student being identified
or de-identified in special education.
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Introduction
Special education has been an important topic in educational policy since its inception in the
1970’s. This importance has continued to grow as special education enrollment and thus funding
have increased in the last 40 years. Vital to the discussion around special education is the topic
of identification and de-identification as having a disability that impacts one’s education.
Variation in special education enrollment across geographic locations, racial groups, and
schooling sectors causes researchers to question the process and incentives involved in
identification and de-identification.
The decision to identify a student as having a disability begins primarily with a student’s
school or parent. Either party can request that a student be assessed for special education
services with proper reasoning. The assessment process is completed, typically, by the school
psychologist and a special educator, though this varies based on the type of disability and
expertise needed. Medical professionals are also involved, particularly for physical disabilities.
Assessment results alone do not determine a student’s eligibility. An Individual Education
Program (IEP) team composed of the student’s parent, a general educator, special educator, and
administrator meet to review the results of the assessment and make a final determination.
Controversy over the process of identifying a student as having a disability and
qualifying for special education services primarily surrounds “fuzzy” disabilities. These are
disabilities such as specific learning disabilities, speech or language impairments, other health
impairments, emotional disturbance, and sometimes even mental retardation. In these cases, the
IEP team exercises its discretion over students who may be on the margin of qualifying for
special education. For example, the qualification used for a specific learning disability is based
on a 1.5 standard deviation discrepancy between a student’s cognitive ability and academic
1

achievement assessments. Despite this explicit line, members of the IEP team have discretion
over eligibility, particularly when scores are on the margin for qualification. In his book
Distinguishing Disability, Colin Dean documents the way in which levels of wealth and
education of parents creates a divide in the amount of power parents hold on an IEP team,
particularly in these eligibility decisions. Chambers, Parrish, & Hikido (1996) interviewed
special education directors in Pennsylvania, finding that they felt that the lack of rigidity in the
regulations for determining eligibility for special education services resulted in an increased
number of parental requests for services. The discretion available in this identification process
provides the opportunity for manipulation if incentives exist for one of the parties to do so.
Several outcomes may result due to these incentives. One result is that public schools
may receive additional funds for those students above their true cost (Green and Forster, 2002).
Wealthier families can ensure that their child gets extra time to complete college entrance exams
such as the SAT or ACT (Ong-Dean, 2009). Special day classes can function as de facto
segregation of males of color (Artiles & Trent, 1994). Whether researchers find
overrepresentation of racial minorities (GAO, 2013) or underrepresentation (Morgan et al, 2015),
the reality is that we do not know the true incidence of disability, particularly “fuzzy disabilities,
in order to determine if policies are “good” or “bad.” Instead, the goal is to anticipate
unintended as well as intended consequences when constructing policies, and evaluate relative
changes over time with the intention of best serving students. The three studies contained in this
dissertation aim to determine how the policies of special education finance formulas, minimum
subgroup size in an accountability system, and private school choice interplay with the
identification of students in special education.
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Relevant Literature
A variety of studies has looked at policy levers that may relate to the rates of students in special
education over time. Figlio and Getzler (2002) analyzed student level data in Florida and found
that students who were lower performing and lower income prior to the implementation of an
accountability system were identified as having a disability at statistically significant higher rates
when the new system was put in place. Hanushek and Raymond (2005) analyzed the relationship
between high-stakes accountability systems and special education enrollment without
statistically significant findings. Research by Kubik (1999) looking at Social Security Income
benefits found that compared to high-income families, families with low-incomes saw a
statistically significant increase in the percent of children identified as having disabilities after
the expansion of benefits in 1990.
Finance Formulas
Several researchers have studied the variation in how schools receive funding for special
education. Julie Cullen (2003) used the differential funding between districts in Texas due to the
state funding equalization policy to analyze how fiscal incentives may affect disability rates from
1991-92 to 1996-97. She found that a 10 percent increase in revenue gain led to a 2.1 percent
increase in the disability rate (Cullen, 2003). Greene and Forster (2002) found that over a ten
year period, a state with a prospective system saw a 1.24 percentage point increase in special
education enrollment compared to a census based system.1 Mahitivanichcha and Parrish (2005)
re-analyzed Greene and Forster’s study finding similar results when replicating their model.
They also used a second model with a poverty measure and found that the effect of a census
system on special education enrollment was somewhat weaker than the prior analyses
Greene and Forster use the term “bounty” to refer to funding systems that provide additional funding for each
student placed in special education. “Lump sum” systems fund base on a state average rate of special education
enrollment rather than a school or districts actual enrollment.
1
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(Mahitivanichcha & Parrish, 2005). Dhuey & Lipscomb (2011) employed a state level fixed
effects model utilizing states that changed from one system to another during the period of 19912000. This research found about a 1.24 percentage point decrease in special education
enrollment when states switched from a prospective to a capitation system. Dhuey and
Lipscomb’s slightly more sophisticated methods yield findings that mirror Greene and Forster’s
earlier work.
Minimum Subgroup Size
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) only required schools to include at-risk subgroups in the
calculation of annual yearly progress (AYP) if they had a minimum enrollment size of that
group.2 This created a potential incentive for under-identification of students for special
education services in order to avoid including the group in AYP calculations. Little empirical
research exists on the actual effect that a state’s minimum subgroup size may have on students
with disabilities. When using a regression discontinuity design to analyze the effect of the
introduction of school accountability for the subgroup of students with disabilities in California,
Wei (2012b) did not find any evidence of improved achievement for these students. Wei (2012a)
did find that the use of more stringent accountability pressures, including a lower minimum
subgroup size, resulted in increased achievement for only Hispanic students. In Florida,
however, schools were more likely to identify low income and low achieving students as having
a disability with the introduction of the state’s accountability system. In particular, schools that
were closer to being considered a failing school participated more heavily in these practices
(Figlio & Getzler, 2002). Similarly, Cullen and Reback (2006) found that schools that had
higher incentives to improve test scores on a state achievement tests were significantly more

2

This enrollment size was determined by each state.
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likely to identify students as in an exempt group, such as students with disabilities, for test taking
purposes.
School Choice
Much of the choice literature regarding students with disabilities is concentrated on concerns that
choice schools discriminate against these students in the enrollment process, resulting in a low
proportion of students with disabilities taking part in school choice. The USCCB’s 2002 survey
found that 7 percent of students enrolled in Catholic schools were identified as having a
disability. Wolf, Witte, and Fleming (2012) had similar findings that at least 7.5 percent and
possibly as many as 14.6 percent of students participating in the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program had a disability. This research team also found no statistical disadvantage during
school admittance to students based on disability (Wolf, 2013).
Most of the literature on school choice and special education revolves around concerns
over enrollment discrimination in the charter sector (Heubert, 1997; Horn & Miron, 2000; Rhim,
2008; Garda, 2012). In recent years, however, several studies have systematically analyzed the
movement of students with disabilities in and out of the charter sector as well as in and out of
special education eligibility status (Setren, 2015; Winters, 2013; 2014; 2015; Winters, Carpenter
II, & Clayton, 2017). These studies, as with Wolf, Witte, and Fleming’s (2012) analysis of
vouchers in Milwaukee, suggest that discrepancies in the enrollment rate of students with
disabilities across school sectors are an issue of parental choice, student mobility, and differential
declassification practices rather than one of discrimination.

5

Hypotheses
Paper 1
a) States decrease their enrollments of students with disabilities when financial incentives to
do so are introduced.
b) When states are induced to decrease their special education enrollments, these decreases
primarily come from students with the least severe disabilities.
c) Once incentives to decrease special education enrollments are introduced, the distribution
of students in special education will become more severe, resulting in a lower proportion
of students being placed in the least inclusive environments.
d) Financial constraints caused by a change to a capitation based special education finance
formula will reduce school resources (e.g. pupil-teacher ratios, teacher salaries, and
revenues)
Paper 2
Given the opportunity to avoid accountability under No Child Left Behind for the subgroup of
students with disabilities, schools in Arkansas will reduce their special education enrollment
when they fall close to the minimum subgroup cutoff of 40 students with disabilities.
a) The reduction in special education enrollment to avoid accountability for the subgroup
under NCLB should be greatest when schools fall closer to the cutoff point of 40.
Paper 3
a) Students who participate in the Louisiana Scholarship Program are less likely to be
identified for special education than those who do not participate?
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b) Students in special education who participate in the Louisiana Scholarship Program ae
more likely to have their special education label removed than those who do not
participate?
Methodology
Paper 1
Event study analysis is used to observe changes in state special education identification rates
over time as states alter their special education finance formulas from prospective to census
based systems and vice-versa. Other possible policy influences are also included in estimation
models such as accountability systems, voucher programs, and school finance court cases. Panel
data used is publicly accessible for all 50 states and the District of Columbia across 22 years,
from 1991-2013.
Paper 2
School-level data are analyzed to determine how rates of special education vary as schools fall
above and below the minimum subgroup size of 40 for students with disabilities in Arkansas.
Fixed effects analysis is used to simply observe the impact of falling above or below the line
while secondary analyses look at how the distance the enrollment level is above and below this
subgroup cutoff has a differential relationship with the rate of students placed in special
education. Panel data used is publicly accessible for over 1,000 Arkansas schools for the years
2004-05 to 2013-14.
Paper 3
Over 10,000 eligible students applied to attend a private school as part of the Louisiana
Scholarship Program (LSP). Over 5,000 students were awarded a scholarship. We leverage the
deferred lottery system to assign students to school to estimate a local average treatment effect
7

(LATE) of being awarded one’s first choice school on the probability of being identified and deidentified for special education while in the program. We estimate our two stage models using a
Cox proportional hazard model for an overall effect and bivariate probits for individual year
effects.
Results
Paper 1


Changing from a prospective to capitation based finance system appears to be related to a
decline in special education enrollment, though our findings are not statistically
significant.



Disaggregated results show declines in non-severe disabilities as a result of switching
from capitation to census funding, in particular for specific learning disabilities.



Decreases occur in the proportion of students with non-severe disabilities enrolled in the
most inclusive educational placements and a marginally significant increase in the
placement of students with severe disabilities in public residential schools



School resources do not appear to be affected positively or negatively by changes in
special education finance formulas.

Paper 2


Falling below the minimum subgroup cutoff of 40 is associated with a 1.5 percentage
point decrease in students with disabilities at the school.



Schools just below the minimum subgroup size cutoff react most strongly to the incentive
to reduce their rates of special education.
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Paper 3


Participating in the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) does not have an effect on the
likelihood of being identified or de-identified for special education when analyzing
across all three years of the program.



Students in the LSP were less likely to be identified for special education in the third year
of the program. They were more likely to have their special education label removed in
the second year and then less likely to have it removed in the third year of the program.
Implications

This research makes it clear that considering the unintentional consequences of policies on
students with disabilities is essential. As funding for special education continues to be an
important policy issue in education, it is necessary to determine whether funding system changes
that became popular in the 1990’s continue to have the same desired effects long term. While a
census based system may help contain short term costs, the lack of local differentiation in these
formulas force schools to utilize general education funds to compensate (Harr, Parrish, &
Chambers, 2008). It is also necessary to consider the possible undesirable effects of such a shift,
particularly on student achievement and postsecondary outcomes, which can also have long term
costs to society as a whole.
Unlike funding formula changes, minimum subgroup sizes were developed for statistical
purposes, not, in themselves, to change behaviors. Nevertheless, schools falling below the cutoff
may want to maintain their status and avoid potential consequences associated with the high
probability of failing to meet AYP due to the low performance of their students with disabilities.
Conversely, schools above the minimum subgroup cutoff may have little hope of lowering their
overall number of students with disabilities and continue with a trend of growth in special
9

education. State accountability systems will shift in the coming years with the Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA) transferring control to the states, but the statistical purpose of the
minimum subgroup size will continue to exist as long as we disaggregate the data for at-risk
groups. Arkansas, itself, has already shifted to a minimum subgroup size of only 25 in the last
year. For this reason, understanding the incentive to under-identify students to avoid
accountability sanctions in this policy is essential for properly constructing minimum subgroup
sizes that reduce negative consequences for students.
Finally, differential incentives that exist for schools of choice and traditional public
schools to identify and de-identify students for special education are important to understand.
Financial incentives, as have been discussed, play one important role. While the Louisiana
Scholarship Program (LSP) does offer an opportunity for additional special education funds,
there were requirements attached in the form of teacher credentialing and school experience
serving students with disabilities. Environmental changes, such as moving to a smaller school or
class sizes, can sometimes substitute for aspects of special education services. Private schools
are likely to see the school itself as an intervention for students. Moreover, different schools
have differing beliefs regarding disability, inclusion, and serving students. Wolf, Witte, and
Fleming (2012) found that private schools did not feel the need to give students a label in order
to serve their needs. All of these potential differences between private and public schools alter
the likelihood of identification and de-identification. In the LSP, the high rate of deidentification in the first years is likely why the de-identification rates were substantially below
the public schools’ by the third year of the program. This shows evidence of differing
equilibriums for special education identification between the two sectors. For researchers and
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policy makers, these differences must be considered when attempting to compare enrollment
rates across schooling sectors.
Only the policy of census based finance formulas had the stated purpose of altering the
percent of students with disabilities enrolled in schools. Regardless of intention, these policies
have impacts on decisions made at schools regarding the referral and identification of students
for special education. Policy makers and school personnel do their best to construct and
implement procedures that will improve the efficiency, accountability, and quality of education
students receive. More attention needs to be made with regards to how policies may
inadvertently interact with one another in potentially negative ways. While we can never know a
student’s true disability status, it is our job to at least limit the incentives for schools to
misidentify students.

11

References
Chambers, J.G., Parrish, T.B., Hikido, C. (1996) Special Education Expenditures and Revenues
in a Census-Based Funding System: A Case Study in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. American Institutes for Research, Center for Special Education Finance.
Cullen, J. B., & Reback, R. (2006). Tinkering toward accolades: School gaming under a
performance accountability system (No. w12286). National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Dhuey, E., Lipscomb, S. (2011) Funding special education by capitation: Evidence from state
ﬁnance reforms. Education Finance and Policy 6(2): 168–201.
Figlio, D.N., Getzler, L.S. (2002) Accountability, Ability and Disability: Gaming the System.
NBER Working Paper 9307.
Garda, Jr., R. A. (2012). Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools. Selected Works.
Greene, J.P., Forster, G. (2002) Effects of funding incentives on special education enrollment.
Civic Report of the Center for Civic Innovation at the Manhattan Institute 32: 1–13.
Harr, Jenifer J., Tom Parrish, and Jay Chambers. (2008). Special Education. Handbook of
Research in Education Finance and Policy. Eds. Helen F. Ladd and Edward B. Fiske.
Routledge: New York, New York. pp. 575–590.
Heubert, J. P. (1997). Schools without Rules? Charter Schools, Federal Disability Law, and the
Paradoxes of Deregulation. Harvard Civil Liberties Law Review, 32, 301-353.
Horn, J., & Miron, G. (2000). An Evaluation of the Michigan Charter School Initiative:
Performance, Accountability, and Impact Executive Summary. The Evaluation Center
Western Michigan University.
Hosp, J. L., & Reschly, D. J. (2004). Disproportionate representation of minority students in
special education: Academic, demographic, and economic predictors. Exceptional
Children, 70(2), 185-199.
Koot, H. M., & Verhulst, F. C. (1992). Prediction of children's referral to mental health and
special education services from earlier adjustment. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 33(4), 717-729.
Lloyd, J. W., Kauffman, J. M., Landrum, T. J., & Roe, D. L. (1991). Why do teachers refer
pupils for special education? An analysis of referral records. Exceptionality: A Special
Education Journal, 2(3), 115-126.
Mahitivanichcha, K., and Parrish, T. (2005) Do non-census funding systems encourage special
education identiﬁcation? Reconsidering Greene and Forster. Journal of Special Education
Leadership 18: 38–46.
12

Mamlin, N., & Harris, K. R. (1998). Elementary teachers' referral to special education in light of
inclusion and prereferral:" Every child is here to learn… but some of these children are in
real trouble." Journal of Educational Psychology, 90(3), 385.
Rhim, L. M. (2008). Special Education Challenges and Opportunities in the Charter School
Sector. Center for Reinventing Public Education, Working Papers, 1-40.
Setren, E. (2015). Special Education and English Language Learner Students in Boston Charter
Schools: Impact and Classification. School Effectiveness & Inequity Initiative Working
Paper #2015.03. Retrieved from http://seii.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/SetrenSEII-discussion-paper_12.7.15.pdf.
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. (2002). Catholic School Children with
Disabilities. Washington, DC. Retrieved on January 6, 2014, from
www.usccb.org/education/fedasst/idea.htm.
Wei, X. (2012a). Are more stringent NCLB state accountability systems associated with better
student outcomes? An analysis of NAEP results across states. Educational Policy, 26(2),
268-308.
Wei, X. (2012b). Does NCLB improve the achievement of students with disabilities? A
regression discontinuity design. Journal of Research on Educational Effectiveness, 5(1),
18-42.
Winters, M. A. (2013). Why the Gap? Special Education and New York City Charter Schools.
The Center for Reinventing Public Education, Seattle: WA.
Winters, Marcus A. (2014). Understanding the Charter School Special Education Gap: Evidence
from Denver, Colorado. The Center for Reinventing Public Education, Seattle: WA.
Winters, M. A. (2015). Understanding the Gap in Special Education Enrollments between
Charter and Traditional Public Schools Evidence from Denver, Colorado. Educational
Researcher, 0013189X15584772.
Winters, M. A., Carpenter II, D.M., Clayton, G. (2017). Does Attending a Charter School
Reduce the Likelihood of Being Placed Into Special Education? Evidence from Denver,
Colorado. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis.
Wolf, P. J, Witte, J. F., & Fleming, D. J. (2012). Special Education and the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program. School Choice Demonstration Project Milwaukee evaluation report #35
Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas. Retrieved January 10, 2014 from
http://www.uaedreform.org/downloads/2012/02/report-35-special-education-and-themilwaukee-parental-choice-program.pdf.

13

Chapter 1
Special Education Funding Incentivizes in a Capitation Based System
Introduction
With the passage of the All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, and finally the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) in
1997 and 2004, guaranteeing a free and appropriate education (FAPE) for students with
disabilities in public schools, special education enrollment and, subsequently, expenditures have
continued to grow at all levels of government. For 2014-15, over $12.5 billion dollars were
allocated for special education by the federal government (Department of Education, 2015).
Federal spending, however, is only a small portion of the overall revenue attributed to supporting
students with disabilities. The method for distributing local, state, and federal funds to each
school district is determined at the state level. This study aims to build upon prior research on
how these various systems for distributing special education funds may create incentives to
increase enrollment through new identification or decrease it through removal of special
education status.
Identification of Students
Parents or school staff initiate the process of referring a student for a special education
assessment. This assessment process is typically completed by the school psychologist and a
special educator and must be occur within 60 days of when the referral was made.3 Assessment
results cannot be the sole determinant of a student’s eligibility for special education. An
Individual Education Program (IEP) team composed of the student’s parent(s), a general

3

Additional professionals can be included in the assessment process based on the needs of the student and
hypothesized disability. These might include speech and language therapists, medical doctors, or occupational
therapists.
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educator, special educator, and school or district administrator meet to review the results of the
assessment and make a final determination.
Controversy over the process of identifying a student as having a disability and
qualifying for special education services primarily surrounds “fuzzy” disabilities. These are
disabilities that are less clearly detectible such as specific learning disabilities, speech or
language impairments, other health impairments, and emotional disturbance. Assessment results
may not provide definite guidance for the IEP team, which then exercises its discretion over
students who may be on the margin of qualifying for special education. For example, the
standard practice used for qualifying a student as having a specific learning disability is that
there is a 1.5 standard deviation discrepancy between a student’s cognitive ability and academic
achievement assessments. While this standard seems to draw a very clear line between being
and not being eligible, the members of the IEP team can still make a determination that a student
receive services, particularly if the student’s scores sit on the margin of this qualification. In his
book Distinguishing Disability, Colin Dean documented the way in which levels of wealth and
education of parents creates a divide in the amount of power parents hold on an IEP team,
particularly in these eligibility decisions. Chambers, Parrish, & Hikido (1996) interviewed
special education directors as part of their evaluation of Pennsylvania’s funding system change.
The directors felt that the lack of rigidity in the regulations for determining eligibility for special
education services resulted in an increased number of parental requests for services.
The flexibility of an IEP team in determining whether a student qualifies for special
education services may be consciously or unconsciously influenced by financial incentives. The
cost of services provided by the school is not at the forefront of parents minds. Parents are
focused on their students receiving the help and support they need from their school for their
15

success (Dhuey & Lipscomb, 2011). If a student only marginally needs services, school
personnel may be unmotivated to qualify a student for special education services when the
funding system does not provide compensation for a shift in total special education enrollment.
Systems that fund schools for each additional student placed in special education may create an
incentive to qualify a student on the margin even if he or she would be at least as well served
without the new identification.
States started to consider reforming funding mechanisms to decrease incentives to overidentify students for special education and to slow the increase in special education enrollment
and overall expenditures.
Special Education Funding Formulas
Several studies have attempted to categorize and analyze the types of special education
funding systems in each state. A 2003 report by the Center for Special Education Finance
(CSEF) analyzed survey results from state special education directors in 1999-00. From these
surveys, they categorized and summarized each type of funding system (Parrish et al., 2003).
Nine years later, as part of Project Forum, the National Association of State Directors of Special
Education updated Parrish et al. (2003) through similar surveys to state special education
directors (Ahearn, 2010). These studies provide the foundation in which we create two
groupings of special education finance formulas based on the incentives they create for
identification.
The first type of system is a capitation system. Capitation systems, as termed by the
medical insurance field, provides a lump-sum that is not based on variation between individuals,
but expects that the school districts will provide services within a finite amount of money
provided (Newhouse, 1996). Like in the medical field, the purpose of capitation is to incentivize
16

efficiency rather than increasing services for a marginal benefit. The most common funding
system that falls into the category of a capitation system is a census based formula. A census
funding formula applies a state average rate of special education enrollment to district total
enrollment or Average Daily Membership/Average Daily Attendance (ADM/ADA) to determine
special education funding (Ahearn, 2010). Some flat grant formulas also function in this same
manner, allocating funds for special education based on district total enrollment. Capitation
funding systems allocate resources using an assumed rate of disability across the state rather than
a true rate within each district. The supposition under a capitation system is that there is not, or
should not be, any variation in disability incidence across school districts.
The remaining funding formulas are prospective systems. These funding formulas
allocate or reimburse expenditures on the basis of the actual number of students with disabilities,
many by the type of disability. The most common type of prospective system uses weights for
students with disabilities. Weights, or multipliers, are applied to the special education
enrollment overall or separately for each disability. In her 2008-09 surveys, Ahearn (2010) found
that 19 out of 50 states were utilizing either a single weight or multiple different weights based
either on the type of disability or special educational environment for individual students. Some
states allocate funding based on the number of teachers or classrooms needed to service the
actual special education population in a district (Ahearn, 2010). Additionally, a few states have a
formula based on a percent of expenditures that can be reimbursed by the state for special
education. Finally, states may also use a block grant funding formula that provides revenues
based on a base year or the prior year’s special education revenues or enrollment (Ahearn, 2010).
Each of these funding formulas under a prospective system provide an incentive for districts to
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spend freely on services and even increase special education enrollment because they will
receive additional funding for each new student placed in special education.
Some states use a combination of capitation and prospective funding systems. Many of
these systems, however, only differentiate between the most expensive to fund students
(catastrophic funding) and all other students with disabilities, which has become common
practice in most capitation systems as well. Other states do not have a specific allocation for
special education funding and incorporate it into their overall funding for districts (Ahearn,
2010). We will discuss below how we categorize states that do not clearly fall into the
prospective or capitation system.
Other Factors
Accountability systems
Several studies have evaluated the impact of an accountability system on special
education enrollment rates. Figlio and Getzler (2002) analyzed student level data in Florida,
finding lower performing and lower income students were more likely to be identified as having
a disability when the new accountability system was put in place, likely in order to exclude them
from accountability testing. These exclusionary practices were particularly common at lower
income and lower performing schools that were potentially at risk of being labeled as a failing
school under the new system (Figlio & Getzler, 2002). These findings indicate that schools react
to incentives created by broader policies, which can unintentionally result in changes in special
education identification practices. Subsequent studies by other researchers failed to find any
statistically significant effects of a high-stakes accountability system on disability identification
rates (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Greene & Forster, 2002; Dhuey & Lipscomb, 2011). Unlike
Figlio and Getzler’s analyses, these other studies use aggregated state-level data and look across
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states rather than examining student-level data in one state, potentially masking some of the
individual changes that occurred within schools and/or within states.
All relevant studies, however, use data that only extend slightly into the early 2000’s,
with 2003 the most recent data used by Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011). It is possible that
incentives from NCLB were delayed, and did not show up in these earlier studies. Using a
longer span of data to 2013, the present study is better positioned to observe whether a long term
effect of accountability exists.
Special education voucher programs
In 1997, Arizona introduced the first publicly funded voucher program specifically for
students with disabilities to attend private schools in the state. Since then, a total of 18 different
voucher, tax credit scholarships, and education savings account programs for students with
disabilities now exist in 13 states. While enrollment in these programs is generally pretty small,
enrolling fewer than 500 students, programs like Florida’s John M. McKay Scholarship for
Students with Disabilities currently enrolls over 30,000 students (EdChoice, 2017). These
programs provide parents with the opportunity to choose the educational settings and/or services
that their child receives without the hurdles of the IEP team and administrative authorization
(Greene & Buck, 2010).
There are two competing theories at work with regards to special education vouchers and
identification in special education. One theory is that parents of students with disabilities are
inclined to have their students assessed for special education with the hope that their student will
qualify to receive a scholarship and attend a private school of choice. Conversely, local schools
and districts are deterred from qualifying a student for special education because this will also
enable that student to take his or her entire state funding to a private school. This hypothesis
would be particularly true for students on the margin of qualifying for special education who do
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not require as many services as other students but receive the same funding. Winters and Greene
(2009) specifically analyzed the enrollment trends in Florida from 2002-03, three years after the
initial special education voucher pilot year, to 2005-06. Using the total number of participating
private schools within a five mile radius of each public school to measure the competitive effects
from exposure to the voucher program by traditional public schools, they found that special
education enrollment decreased for students with specific learning disabilities and, to a greater
extent, those with higher achievement test scores (Winters & Greene, 2009). Chakrabarti (2013)
used a regression discontinuity design to more closely assess causal impacts of the McKay
voucher program on special education identification in like of accountability pressures. She
found no effect on the identification of students to special education.
Still, we will attempt to use this framework to guide the inclusion of a variable
identifying the year a state enacted a special education voucher program to determine whether
these policies may have a more widespread effect on special education enrollment.
Social Security Income benefits
A final mechanism that may drive special education enrollment rates is Social Security
benefits. Kubik (1999) studied the influence of increased Social Security Income benefits after
1990 on the number of households claiming benefits for children identified as having a
disability. This research found that compared to high-income families, families with lowincomes saw a statistically significant increase in the percent of children identified as having
disabilities after the expansion of benefits in 1990. This change also seemed to broaden the
types of disabilities receiving benefits, particularly intellectual disabilities. Kubik (1999) also
found that the receipt of Social Security Income benefits for children with disabilities resulted in
more doctor visits and referrals to special education. The influence that additional funding and
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resources can have for a family, in this case, rather than just a school, is another important
consideration in the analysis of special education identification changes.
This paper builds from the previous literature exploring how incentives that exist for
capitation and prospective systems may influence the rate of special education enrollment in a
given state. Specifically, this work updates the categorization of states that fall into the two
types of systems, as some have changed in the last ten years, and expand the number of years of
data used in the analyses. These specification changes will inform whether the prior
relationships seen in the literature maintain strength over time, and determine how robust these
results are to alternative interpretations for categorizing state funding formulas.
The subsequent section of this paper will review the literature on this topic. We will then
describe the methodology used, including a description of the general trends in the data. Next,
the analytic strategy will be explained followed by results from all analyses conducted. We
conclude with a discussion of the findings, policy implications, and potential for future research.
Prior Literature
Starting in the 1980’s, researchers began to descriptively analyze how special education
funding influences enrollment of students with disabilities in special education (McLaughlin &
Owings, 1992). By the mid to late 1990’s, the CSEF, directed by Tom Parrish, and their Special
Education Expenditure Project, led by Jay G. Chambers, were conducting studies on how special
education funds were being dispersed in states. Parrish and Montgomery (1995) published case
studies of Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont to evaluate how or whether each state chose to
reform their special education financing system. At the time, states were encountering the rising
cost of special education and considering the option of developing capitation systems.
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An early piece quantitatively analyzing special education by Dempsey and Fuchs (1993)
analyzed the different types of funding systems available in Tennessee to determine whether they
altered the distribution of students with disabilities into various educational environments.
Evidence from this work demonstrated that when a funding formula changed from a single
weight formula to multiple weights, which compensated for more expensive placements,
students with disabilities were placed less frequently in the least restrictive environments in
regular education programs (Dempsey & Fuchs, 1993). Ten years later, Julie B. Cullen (2003)
used the differential funding between districts in Texas as part of the state funding equalization
policy to analyze how fiscal incentives may affect disability rates from 1991-92 to 1996-97. She
found that a 10 percent increase in special education revenue led to a 2.1 percent increase in the
disability rate, and the financial incentives alone were able to explain nearly 40 percent of the
variation in disability rates (Cullen, 2003). In another state specific analysis, Kwak (2010)
looked at how the change in California’s special education finance formula from a weighted
(prospective) to census-based (capitation) system impacted special education enrollment, finding
that for every $1000 decrease in funding received by a district, special education enrollment
decreased 1.5 percentage points (Kwak, 2010).
The by Greene and Forster (2002) analyzed funding system differences across states
categorized system as either a “bounty” (prospective) or “lump-sum” (capitation) funding
system. The label of “bounty” demonstrates the fact that each “head” or child is associated with
money obtained by a school under the prospective system. The authors utilized the Annual
Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for
the years 1991-92 to 2000-01 to determine the relationship between the type of funding system
employed and enrollment rates in special education. They found that over a ten year period, a
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state with a “bounty” system saw a 1.24 percentage point increase in special education
enrollment (Greene & Forster, 2002). Mahitivanichcha and Parrish (2005) re-analyzed Greene
and Forster’s study finding similar results when replicating their model. They also used a second
model with a poverty measure and found that the effect of changing from a capitation to
prospective system on special education enrollment was somewhat weaker than Greene and
Forster (Mahitivanichcha & Parrish, 2005).
The most recent study to quantitatively analyze the relationship between a state’s special
education funding system and the enrollment of students in special education was published in
2011 by Dhuey and Lipscomb. They employed a state level fixed effects model utilizing states
that changed from one system to another during the period of 1991-2000. This research found
about a 1.24 percentage point decrease in special education enrollment when states switched
from a prospective to a capitation system. The effect size found with Dhuey and Lipscomb’s
more analytically rigorous method is identical to Greene and Forster’s findings, just stated in the
opposite manner.
The current research will build off of Dhuey and Lipscomb’s (2011) research and
improve upon their state-level fixed effects with an event study framework to better control for
time-trends (Lafortune, Rothstein, Schanzenbach, 2016). By including more years of data both
prior and following funding system changes, this paper can demonstrate whether the trends seen
in the early 2000’s were merely proximal or are long term effects. Unlike prior research, this
paper will also attempt to determine whether the advent of special education voucher programs
have an effect on the enrollment of students in special education. Finally, utilizing newer
surveys of state special education directors regarding the type of funding formulas for special

23

education, this study considers a different sample of states that switched from a prospective to
capitation system.
Research Methodology
Data Description
Data for this study come from a wide variety of sources. State level data concerning
special education enrollment counts by disability and educational environment for the years
1990-91 to 2005-06 were obtained from the Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.4 Data for the years 1990-91, 1991-92, and 199394 were obtained through microfiche of original documents, scanned, and input by hand by the
researcher. The final years in the dataset, 2006-07 to 2012-13, special education enrollment
counts, educational environments, and personnel counts were all retrieved digitally through
ideadata.org. All special education data were gathered for students ages 6-21 only.
An important data issue arose in regards to how the types of educational environments
were coded in different years. Prior to 1997-98, students educated in public schools were either
counted as placed in a “Regular Class,” “Resource Room,” or “Separate Class.” From 1997-98
on, these three categories were changed into the percent of the school day a student was in or out
of the general education classroom.5 For coding purposes, each type of class was equated to a
given percent in the general education classroom. “Regular class” was considered the most
inclusive and coded as 80 percent or more time in the regular education classroom. “Resource
Room” is typically a service that requires students to leave the general education classroom for a
period of the day, so it was coded as 40 percent to 79 percent in the regular education classroom.
4

Both Greene and Forster (2002) and Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011) utilize this same data source.
From 1997-98 to 2005-06, these percents are given based on the amount of time a student was place out of the
general education classroom. 2007-08 and all years after, the terminology was changed to reflect inclusivity and
reported as the percent of time a student was inside the general education classroom. The percentage values were
equivalent across these time periods.
5
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Finally, “Separate Class” was coded as inside the general education classroom less than 40
percent. Additionally, there are five different types of out of school placements, public day
school, private day school, public residential, private residential, and home/hospital care.
Analyses are conducted looking at each individually out of school placement option as well as
the total percent of students placed out of school.
Table 1: Variables used in analyses
Variable
Educational environment by
disability

Years of Data
1990-91 to 2005-06

Source
Annual Report to Congress on the
Implementation of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act
ideadata.org

Educational environment by
2006-07 to 2012-13
disability
Total enrollment
1990-91 to 2012-13 National Center on Educational
Full-time employed staff
Statistics (NCES) Common Core
Student race
of Data (CCD)
Free or reduced price lunch status
Limited English proficiency
Local revenues
State revenues
Federal revenues
Total revenues
Teacher salaries
Social Security Insurance (SSI)
1990-91 to 2012-13 Annual Social Security
benefits
Supplement
Unemployment rates
1990-91 to 2012-13 Bureau of Labor Statistics
Notes: All variables were acquired at for all 50 states and Washington, D.C.

Primary analyses focus on changes in overall disability rates. To determine whether there
are heterogeneous effects in our study, disabilities are grouped as severe or non-severe along
with disaggregating by individual disability. In their study, Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011) choose
to create their distinction between severe and non-severe based on cost of educating the different
students with disabilities. In this analysis, however, the interest is not so much in the net cost of
educating a student, but also the marginal revenue gained from assigning a student to one
category versus another. While analyses in the current study will use Dhuey and Lipscomb’s
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definition of disabilities as severe and non-severe, we also redefine non-severe by including
intellectual disabilities. Specific learning disabilities (SLD), speech or language impairments
(SLI), emotional disturbance (ED), and other health impairments6 (OHI), and intellectual
disabilities (ID)7 are all considered high-incidence disabilities, are often in the less severe range,
and thus lower cost. More importantly, each of these disabilities can be somewhat subjectively
determined by the IEP team, making them more likely to shift under a change in funding system.
Under a prospective system, students with intellectual disabilities may be more likely to be
educated in a separate classroom because the school district will be reimbursed for this higher
cost educational setting. In a capitation system, however, the school is incentivized to place this
same student in a more inclusive setting that is lower cost. As previously mentioned, analyses
are conducted using both definitions as well as disaggregated by disability in order to observe the
impact on this variation in definition.
All data on total enrollment, full-time employed staff, student race, free or reduced price
lunch status, limited English proficiency, local, state, federal, and total revenues, and teacher
salaries8 were obtained through the National Center on Educational Statistics (NCES) Common
Core of Data (CCD). Unemployment rates for all years of data were acquired from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Finally, Social Security Income benefits for children were found in the
Annual Social Security Supplement.
Finally, information on the type of funding system for each state was collected and
categorized. Table 2 displays how we used Ahearn’s (2010) funding formula types to create

6

Other health impairments has come to primarily be composed of students with diagnoses of AD/HD, which has
caused a greater increase in student eligibility in this disability category.
7
Intellectual disabilities is the chosen terminology for this paper, however, it should be noted that mental retardation
remains what is used in IDEA. Cognitive impairments is also used by some for the same categorization.
8
All revenues (local, state, federal, and total), salaries, and Social Security Income benefits were all adjusted to
account for inflation and converted to 2014 dollars.
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initial categorizations. To compare prior categorizations, Table 3 presents the definitions used
and associated years of policy change in prior literature as well as the current study. Two states,
Missouri and New Jersey, changed their funding formulas in 2005 and 2008 respectively. As
Dhuey and Lipscomb used Parrish et al. (2003) as their reference, which is based on surveys in
1999-00, these two states are also categorized differently, as are Arkansas and Rhode Island,
which do not have a specific funding formula. In these two states, however, funding is allocated
for special education based on the whole school enrollment. This is essentially a capitation
based funding formula, which does not allocate funds for each additional student placed in
special education. We present all findings utilizing Dhuey and Lispcomb’s definitions in the
appendix.
Table 2: Capitation and prospective special education formulas
Capitation
Multiple student weights
Single weight
Resource-based
Percentage reimbursement

Prospective

Census-based
Block grant

No separate funding formula
Combination
Notes: Types of formulas were derived from Ahearn (2010). Categorizations based on
author’s interpretation of incentives. No separate funding formula and combination formulas
can be categorized as either incentive type based on the actual construction of the formula.
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Table 3: State special education funding system changes, 1991-2013
Tuchman
(2017)
Year of Change
Capitation
1995
Capitation
1998
Prospective
1981
Capitation
1996
Capitation
1998
Prospective
1994
Capitation
1995
Prospective
2006
Capitation
1994
Capitation
1993
Capitation
2005
Capitation
1994
Prospective
1999
Capitation
2008
Capitation/
1995/
North Dakota
Capitation
Capitation
Prospective
2013
Pennsylvania
Capitation
Capitation
Capitation
1992
Rhode Island
Capitation
Prospective
Capitation
1995
Utah
Capitation
Combination
Capitation
1991
Notes: Bolded lines indicate funding formulas that are categorized differently from prior analyses.
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Hawaii
Idaho
Massachusetts
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Greene & Forster
(2002)
Capitation
Capitation
Prospective
Capitation
Capitation
Prospective
Capitation
Prospective
Capitation
Capitation
Capitation
Capitation
Prospective
Prospective

Dhuey & Lipscomb
(2011)
Capitation
Capitation
Prospective
Prospective
Capitation
Prospective
Capitation
Prospective
Capitation
Capitation
Combination
Capitation
Prospective
Prospective

Descriptive Statistics
Over the 22 year time span of the database created, special education enrollment ranges
from just over 10 percent in the early 1990’s to just over 12 percent of total student enrollment in
the mid-2000’s (Figure 1). Special education enrollment began to drop slowly in about 2006,
and seems to have plateaued in the most recent years from 2010 to 2013. The data in Figure 1
tells a very different story than what one often believes about special education. The downward
trend in 2006 also highlights the importance of the current study in determining whether changes
in special education finance formulas actually have long term impacts on special education
enrollment.
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Figure 1: Trends in special education enrollment, 1991-2013

Descriptive differences in special education enrollment trends between states with
prospective versus capitation based special education finance formulas suggest what more
rigorous analytic methods might confirm. One interesting observation in the data is the
increased variation in enrollment over time from a seemingly tighter distribution in the 1990’s to
a more dispersed distribution by the 2010’s. States that adopted capitation based formulas
started with higher rates of special education enrollment. Despite lower enrollments, states with
other formulas steadily increased their rates over time while capitation states stayed relatively
consistent. The dotted line in the year 2003 indicates the last year of data used by other
researchers to analyze the issue of funding incentives in special education when the slope of noncapitation funding formula states was rising, and the gap between capitation and non-capitation
formulas was quite clear. In about 2008, the trend lines intersect, and the most recent data only
show a small separation in trends. Moreover, there is a slight indication that capitation states
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show a downward slope in enrollment. We also can see evidence of an extreme outlier at the top
of the distribution. This state is Rhode Island, which is also one of the states that we categorize
differently than Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011).9
Figure 2: Capitation versus other funding systems and special education enrollment,
1991-2013

Analytic Strategy
All analyses estimate effects using an event study methodology that leverages changes in
state’s funding systems over time in order to determine the effect while limiting endogeneity
caused by the unobservable differences between states (Wolfers, 2006). The following linear
model is based on Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach (2016):
9

Using the prior definitions of the funding systems results in similar trend lines, though the non-capitation based
systems have a slightly steeper slope that results in the two trends intersecting about 10 years earlier (Appendix
Figure 1).

30

𝐶𝑎𝑝
𝐶𝑎𝑝
𝑌𝑠𝑡 = ∝𝑡 + 1(𝑡 > 𝑡𝑠∗ )𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑝 + 1(𝑡 > 𝑡𝑠∗ )(𝑡 − 𝑡𝑠∗ )𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
+ 1(𝑡 > 𝑡𝑠∗ )(𝑡 + 𝑡𝑠∗ )𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
+

(𝑡 − 𝑡𝑠∗ )𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 + (𝑡 + 𝑡𝑠∗ )𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 𝜑𝑠 + 𝑢𝑠𝑡

(1)

Where s indicates each state in time t, which is a capitation state if t is after the policy change
year 𝑡𝑠∗ between the years either 1991 – 2003, replicating Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011), or with
𝐶𝑎𝑝
updated data from 1991 - 2013. Included are controls for the anticipatory build up, 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
, and
𝐶𝑎𝑝
𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟
, the delayed reaction to the policy change in years after implementation. 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 and

𝛽𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 are time trend variables that should be equal to zero as a check that results are not driven
by a national trend in the dependent variable.
Our dependent variable, Yst, varies for each estimation. The first analysis will model Yst
as the fraction of special education enrollment as measured by the number of students all special
education environments over the total enrollment of all students in the state in a given year.
Subsequent analyses will examine this fraction as it relates to severe and non-severe disabilities.
To disaggregate further, special education enrollment will also be analyzed in regards to each
disability individually.10
Our primary variable of interest is 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑝 , which takes the value of zero for each year a
state is considered a prospective system and a one for years it is a capitation system. As
mentioned in the prior section, the type of funding system was determined through the use of
several sources, including Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011), Ahearn (2010), Parrish et al. (2003) and
Greene and Forster (2002). When sources conflicted in regards to which system was present for
a given state, the state’s funding formula was reviewed to determine what type of incentive a
state might have to qualify or not qualify a given student on the margin of eligibility for special

10

Data was not available consistently for the disability category of developmental disability, so it is not included in
any analyses.
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education services. An indicator is also utilized to analyze the potential influence of other
funding changes that occur in states on the identification of students with disabilities.
We also estimate non-parametric models that capture any non-linear increase or decrease
in special education enrollment following a funding policy change.
𝑌𝑠𝑡 = ∝𝑡 + ∑5𝑟=−5 1(𝑡 = 𝑡𝑠∗ + 𝑟)𝛽𝑟 + 𝜑𝑠 + 𝑢𝑠𝑡

(2)

In our non-parametric models, 𝛽𝑟 is an estimate of the effect of the policy change r years after
the change occurred. We allow the 𝑟 to take on values, −5 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 5, five years prior and five
years following the policy change. Effects in the year of the policy change when 𝑟 = 0 are
excluded. This construction enables us to observe each policy change for the same amount of
time given the final change occurred in 2008.
This study additionally includes three education policy specific variables that may alter
special education enrollment. Indicators for the presence of a special education voucher
program, an accountability system (Hanushek and Raymond, 2005), and school finance court
cases (Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach, 2016) in time t are included in most models. A
vector of state level covariates for the unemployment rate; the percent of students who were
black, Hispanic, or other race; the percent of students receiving free or reduced lunch; and the
average monthly Social Security Income benefit are also included. Finally, φs contains the state
level fixed effect that eliminates any time-invariant unobservable characteristics for an individual
state. Due to the heterogeneous nature of each state’s policy environment, standard errors are
clustered at the state level in all analyses (Arellano, 1987).
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Results
Special Education Enrollment
The most basic question we aim to answer is regarding the ability of funding formula
changes to incentivize changes in special education enrollment. We present estimates from our
linear model for the limited time frame (Columns 1 and 2) used by other studies as well as with
our updated data (Columns 3 and 4) that includes newer policy changes (Table 4).11 Coefficients
on capitation are with respect to prospective funding formulas. Our preferred specification in
Columns 2 and 4 show similar negative effects of a change from a prospective to capitation
based system, but are only marginally significant in our shorter time span (Column 2). It should
also be noted that these coefficients are about half the size of what Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011)
find for their overall models.
Even though we do not see any effects in our linear models, we may find different results
if we allow for the growth in special education enrollment to be non-linear with respect to time.
Table 5 shows the estimates for the total year to year change in special education enrollment for
states for the five years following a change to a capitation based formula. We find no evidence
to suggest that the differences in enrollment in these states were different from those in states
that did not change their finance formulas to a capitation system. All models indicate a null
relationship between a capitation formula and special education enrollment. The standard errors
on all model coefficients in the non-parametric model are quite large, lacking precision in the
estimates. Based on these results and our graphical representations, treating our data linearly is
most appropriate. All further results will be for our linear model (1).

11

Replication analyses using prior categorizations of funding formulas are available in the appendix. Our
replication findings are nearly identical to Dhuey and Lipscomb’s
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Table 4: Linear model estimating a change to a capitation system
1991-2003

Capitation formula

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0047
(0.0031)

-0.0059*
(0.0035)
-0.0007
(0.0023)
0.0027
(0.0019)
-0.0037
(0.0023)
0.0282
(0.0191)
-0.3527*
(0.2002)
-0.0631
(0.0490)
-0.0378
(0.0891)
0.1395***
(0.0383)

-0.0045
(0.0032)

-0.0045
(0.0037)
-0.0005
(0.0028)
0.0040
(0.0033)
-0.0012
(0.0025)
0.0278**
(0.0132)
-0.0742
(0.1339)
-0.0807**
(0.0345)
0.0232**
(0.0100)
0.1069***
(0.0266)

Voucher program
Accountability
Court win
Free/reduced lunch
Black
Hispanic
Other race
Constant

1991-2013

0.1060***
(0.0010)

0.1059***
(0.0013)

Observations
663
616
1,173
1,126
Number of states
51
51
51
51
Adj. R-squared
0.4849
0.6102
0.2682
0.3075
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for state average Social Security
Income benefits and unemployment rates.
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Table 5: Non-parametric model estimating a change to a capitation system
1991-2003

Capitation formula

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0000
(0.0115)

0.0004
(0.0107)
0.0001
(0.0023)
0.0029
(0.0019)
-0.0045*
(0.0024)
0.0267
(0.0194)
-0.3254
(0.2004)
-0.0669
(0.0485)
-0.0616
(0.0932)
0.1316***
(0.0385)

0.0000
(0.0093)

0.0017
(0.0087)
-0.0002
(0.0027)
0.0040
(0.0033)
-0.0017
(0.0024)
0.0271*
(0.0135)
-0.0646
(0.1345)
-0.0822**
(0.0342)
0.0196*
(0.0113)
0.1008***
(0.0258)

Voucher program
Accountability
Court win
Free/reduced lunch
Black
Hispanic
Other race
Constant

1991-2013

0.1058***
(0.0010)

0.1057***
(0.0014)

Observations
663
616
1,173
1,126
Number of states
51
51
51
51
Adj. R-squared
0.4755
0.5994
0.2613
0.3002
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for state average Social Security
Income benefits and unemployment rates.
We also test for whether any one state drives our results. We run our basic estimates of
the relationship between a state change to a capitation based funding system and special
education enrollment omitting one state from our analyses at a time. Rhode Island appears, both
visually in the data, as well as in this specification test, to be an outlier that is driving our results
toward zero. While still not as large as Dhuey and Lipscomb’s estimates, omitting Rhode Island
results in a statistically significant decrease of 0.68 percentage points in special education
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enrollments when states switch to a capitation form a prospective funding system (See Appendix
for complete results).
Severe and Non-Severe
We should not expect any effect of special education funding formulas on special
education enrollments to be homogenous across the severity of disabilities. Capitation funding is
“blind” to the disability of an individual student. Weighted or resource based systems, however,
allocate funding based either on the type or educational placement of a student. The underlying
incentive in the capitation system is likely to result in finding a student on the margin of
eligibility ineligible for special education and thus increasing the proportion of students with
more severe disabilities.
We present the results for our analyses of how enrollment of students with severe and
non-severe disabilities are influenced by funding changes from the year 1991-2013 in Table 6.12
Intellectual disabilities are classified as severe in Columns 1-2 and not severe in Columns 5-6.
We see a decrease of under 0.7 percentage points in non-severe disability enrollment and no
change in enrollment of students with severe disabilities, but this result is only marginally
significant. Altering the definition of non-severe to include students with intellectual disabilities
does not change our estimates substantially. The increase in magnitude of the coefficient on
non-severe disabilities, which becomes only marginally significant, indicates a likely negative
relationship for the disability category of intellectual disabilities. This issue will be explored in
the next section when we analyze trends for each disability individually.

12

Results for previously used time span of 1991-2003 can be found in the appendix.
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Table 6: Non-severe and severe enrollment under a capitation funding system
Non-severe w/out ID
(1)
(2)
Capitation formula

-0.006*
(0.0034)

Voucher program
Accountability
Court Win
Free/reduced lunch
Black
*37

Hispanic
Other race
Constant

0.0880***
(0.0013)

-0.007*
(0.0035)
0.0013
(0.0026)
0.0017
(0.0029)
-0.0009
(0.0023)
0.0204
(0.0163)
-0.0809
(0.0782)
-0.0885**
(0.0339)
0.0101
(0.0097)
0.0861**
(0.0347)

Non-severe w/ID
(3)
(4)
-0.0072**
(0.0035)

-0.0074*
(0.0038)
-0.0003
(0.0025)
0.0036
(0.0033)
0.0001
(0.0024)
0.0151
(0.0174)
-0.0480
(0.1005)
-0.0670**
(0.0326)
0.0100
(0.0110)
0.1007*** 0.1107***
(0.0015)
(0.0377)

Severe w/ID
(5)
(6)
0.0012
(0.0013)

0.0182***
(0.0007)

0.0011
(0.0013)
-0.0025***
(0.0008)
0.0015
(0.0016)
0.0004
(0.0010)
-0.0186**
(0.0077)
0.0288
(0.0698)
0.0084
(0.0144)
0.0045
(0.0040)
0.0203
(0.0176)

Severe w/out ID
(7)
(8)
0.0023
(0.0015)

0.0058***
(0.0006)

0.0025
(0.0016)
-0.0011
(0.0008)
-0.0003
(0.0006)
-0.0004
(0.0006)
-0.0101**
(0.0043)
-0.0105
(0.0425)
-0.0140
(0.0109)
0.0042*
(0.0023)
-0.0030
(0.0194)

Observations
1,138
1,094
1,137
1,093
1,040
1,001
1,041
1,002
Number of states
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
Adj. R-squared
0.3281
0.3629
0.3567
0.3723
0.1613
0.2040
0.6177
0.6500
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully specified models (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8)
also include controls for state average Social Security Income benefits and unemployment rates.

Individual Disabilities
Our results from disaggregating disability severity indicate that there may also be some
differential effects of funding formula changes between individual disabilities categories.

It is

unlikely that we can see any significant differences within the severe disability categories due to
their normally small enrollments, which are unlikely to show much variation. Furthermore, there
is often little ambiguity on the part of the IEP team over whether a student has a visual
impairment or not. While a visual impairment may or may not be diagnosed because of a lack of
access to quality medical care, this is unlikely to be associated with a state’s decision to alter
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their special education finance formula. Some more severe disabilities, or those that have a large
spectrum of severity, like intellectual disabilities and even autism, may see changes in their rates
as funding systems change. Moreover, these two categories may also be easily labeled as a
specific learning disability or speech or language impairment depending upon the incentives
present in a funding formula.

Non-severe disabilities (specific learning disabilities, speech or

language impairments, emotional disturbance, and other health impairments), however, are the
disability categories that enroll students on the margin of having a disability or not. For this
reason, they are most likely to have shifting rates of enrollment when funding systems change.
We analyze changes in enrollment for each disability in Table 7 for the previously used
years of 1991-2003 (Columns 1 and 2) and the extended time frame of 1991-2013 (Columns 3
and 4). In all models, we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between
changing to a capitation based funding system and enrollment of students categorized as having a
specific learning disability.

In the expanded time frame, we see that this relationship is nearly

0.9 percentage points lower than when those same states have a prospective funding formula.
This result aligns with the hypothesis that specific learning disabilities are the most likely to be
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influenced by incentives because the nature of eligibility under this disability category involves
the most IEP team discretion. The enrollment size of specific learning disabilities compared to
other disabilities lends itself to more variation between states and over time.
A graphical look at the enrollment trends in Figure 3 demonstrates the differences
between capitation and non-capitation funding states. There are some considerable differences
between funding types in the categories of emotional disturbance, intellectual disabilities, and
autism, but the percent of all students with disabilities from these groups is quite small, making
any differences difficult to detect statistically. Given the size of the group of students labeled as
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having a specific learning disability (SLD) the initial gap between states that became capitation
based systems and those that did not is quite large. It seems plausible that the higher rates of
SLD in these states precipitated the need for a funding system change, and seems to have had the
desired effect of lowering the proportion of students with SLD labels.
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Table 7: Enrollment by disability category for capitation based funding systems

Non-Severe Disabilities

1991-2003

Specific learning disabilities
Speech/ language impairments
Emotional disturbance
Other health impairments
Intellectual disabilities
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Multiple disabilities

Severe Disabilities

Hearing impairments
Orthopedic impairments
Visual impairments
Autism
Deaf/blindness
Traumatic brain injury

1991-2013

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0061***
(0.0016)
-0.0002
(0.0017)
-0.0004
(0.0005)
-0.0003
(0.0011)
0.0007
(0.0011)
0.0014
(0.001)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0001)

-0.0064***
(0.0018)
-0.0002
(0.0014)
-0.0007
(0.0007)
-0.0007
(0.0011)
0.0007
(0.001)
0.0013
(0.0009)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0001)

-0.0096***
(0.0021)
0.0003
(0.0019)
0.0006
(0.0009)
0.0002
(0.0013)
0.0015
(0.0016)
0.0018
(0.0013)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0003
(0.0004)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.0002)

-0.0085***
(0.0022)
0.0003
(0.002)
-0.0002
(0.0008)
-0.0001
(0.0013)
0.0013
(0.0017)
0.0019
(0.0013)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0004
(0.0004)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0002
(0.0001)

Time variant controls
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for other finance formulas,
implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and state average
student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits, and
unemployment rates.
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Figure 3: Differences in enrollment trends by disability in capitation and non-capitation systems
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Educational Environment
Capitation funding systems are blind to both disability and educational placement
determined by the IEP team. Just as enrollment for individual disabilities may be altered when
finance formulas change, educational placements for students may also shift. Fewer non-severe
students or those who are easily placed in the general education classroom most of the day will
result in a higher proportion of students with disabilities being educated in less inclusive settings
since the entire distribution of disability has shifted to be more severe than previously. We
separate each of our analyses by educational placement type and by non-severe and severe
disabilities in Table 8.
As expected, we see that when states switch to a capitation based special education
finance formula they have a lower enrollment for students with non-severe disabilities in the
most inclusive educational placement then when they had a prospective funding formula. The
magnitude of the decline is over 0.87 percentage points in the expanded time frame model,
nearly equivalent to the lower rate of students identified as having specific learning disabilities.
In a complimentary fashion, there is a significant increase of about 0.46 percentage points for
non-severe students placed in a less inclusive setting.13
Students with severe disabilities did not see a significant change in enrollment in our
overall severity and disability specific analyses. Disaggregating enrollment by educational
placement, however, demonstrates that a shift in placement does occur when states change to a
capitation based funding formula. Specifically, there is a an increase of 0.69 percentage points in
the proportion of students with severe disabilities (intellectual disabilities not included) educated

13

Inclusion 40%-79% is most likely two or more subjects taught by a special educator out of the general education
classroom.
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in the two less inclusive regular school settings. There is also a marginally significant increase
in the percent of students with severe disabilities placed out of school.
The increases in students with non-severe disabilities being placed in less inclusive
settings and students with severe disabilities being placed in the least inclusive in-school setting
align with our hypothesis that the distribution of students with disabilities shifts to become more
severe and have few students on the margin of eligibility, thus requiring a higher proportion
educated in less inclusive placements. Higher rates of students with severe disabilities in less
inclusive environments also indicates this shift. This trend also requires on understanding of the
importance of catastrophic aide in special education. The capitation based funding formula may
move the distribution of severity to make the per capita cost of each student in special education
more expensive, but the per student allocation is unlikely to actually change. The additional cost
of educating each student in special education thus forces schools to utilize catastrophic funding
from the state to educate their most expensive students, of which there are now proportionally
more. There is a nominal cost to utilizing catastrophic aid for a district,14 and the state incurs the
remainder. This mechanism has the potential to increase the incentive to advocate that the most
expensive students be placed elsewhere, paid for by the state, instead of in the district.

14

In some states, the district is required to pay up to $15,000, and the state pays the remaining cost (Ahearn, 2010).
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Table 8: Enrollment in educational placements when states change to a capitation funding system
Non Severe w/Intellectual Disabilities
1991-2003
1991-2013
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Inclusion >80%
Inclusion 40%-79%
Inclusion <40%
Out of school
Public special day
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Private special day
Public residential
Private residential
Home/hospital

-0.0670**
(0.0276)
0.0494**
(0.021)
0.0080
(0.0165)
0.0015
(0.0032)
0.0031
(0.0021)
-0.0013
(0.0012)
0.0003
(0.0009)
0.0006
(0.0006)
-0.0005
(0.0005)

-0.0658**
(0.0309)
0.0541**
(0.0222)
0.0080
(0.0154)
-0.0018
(0.0046)
0.0000
(0.0032)
-0.0018
(0.0012)
0.0007
(0.001)
0.0004
(0.0007)
-0.0002
(0.0004)

-0.0884***
(0.0225)
0.0513**
(0.0217)
0.016
(0.0167)
0.0021
(0.0031)
0.0070***
(0.0026)
-0.0016
(0.0012)
0.0005
(0.0008)
0.0006
(0.0006)
-0.0007**
(0.0003)

-0.0867***
(0.0253)
0.0458**
(0.0209)
0.0186
(0.0175)
0.0026
(0.0035)
0.0043
(0.0033)
-0.0001
(0.0015)
0.0009
(0.0008)
0.0011
(0.0007)
-0.0003
(0.0004)

Severe w/out Intellectual Disabilities
1991-2003
1991-2013
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-0.0014
-0.0012
(0.0029)
(0.003)
0.0043*
0.0051*
(0.0026) (0.0028)
0.0037* 0.0045**
(0.0019) (0.0022)
0.0058*** 0.0041*
(0.0021) (0.0021)
0.0029**
0.0022
(0.0014) (0.0015)
0.0014
0.0006
(0.0013) (0.0011)
0.0011*
0.0012
(0.0007) (0.0008)
0.0003
0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0002)
0.0001
0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)

0.0007
0.0027
(0.0031) (0.0032)
0.0055* 0.0069**
(0.0032) (0.0033)
0.0053** 0.0060**
(0.0021) (0.0026)
0.006** 0.0047*
(0.0023) (0.0023)
0.0042*
0.0030
(0.0022) (0.0024)
0.0010
0.0009
(0.001) (0.0009)
0.0012* 0.0012*
(0.0006) (0.0007)
0.0002
0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0002)
0.0002
0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)

Time variant controls
X
X
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully specified models (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8)
also include controls for other finance formulas, implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and state
average student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits, and unemployment rates.

School Resources
Changes to a state’s special education funding formula can have impacts on the broader
school. In particular, the shifting in the distribution of disability severity seen in the previous
section suggests that districts may have much higher costs for each additional student with a
disability but no funding to support that increase. Parrish et al (2004) raises the issue of special
education costs encroaching on general education funds to pay for the federally mandated
entitlement possessed by students with disabilities. This begs the question whether certain
school resources must be cut back to reduce overall spending or other sources of funding need to
be increased to compensate. It is essential to see whether, in the long run, there is a true
difference in the resource allocation under different funding systems.
We analyze the relationship between changing from a weighted to a capitation based
funding formula and pupil-teacher ratios, student enrollment, teacher salaries, and school
revenue in Table 8. We find no relationship between funding formula changes and any of the
school resources we attempt to analyze. Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011) only found a significant
relationship between local revenues and changes to a capitation funding system. Our replication
results using their categorizations, however, do find decreases in overall per pupil revenues that
are driven by state revenue decreases (See Appendix).
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Table 9: Resource allocation changes under capitation funding systems
1991-2003
(1)
(2)
Pupil-teacher ratio
Ln(enrollment)
Ln(teacher salaries)
Total Revenues ($1000's/pupil)
Federal
State
Local

-0.105
(0.255)
0.017
(0.030)
-0.008
(0.023)
-0.163
(0.333)
-0.015
(0.0496)
-0.532
(0.454)
0.379
(0.294)

-0.236
(0.262)
0.015
(0.023)
-0.010
(0.020)
-0.303
(0.246)
-0.061
(0.05)
-0.575
(0.369)
0.321
(0.306)

1991-2013
(3)
(4)
-0.161
(0.328)
0.0009
(0.044)
0.000
(0.032)
0.238
(0.338)
0.006
(0.080)
-0.142
(0.33)
0.356
(0.279)

0.035
(0.329)
0.012
(0.033)
-0.006
(0.031)
-0.630
(0.495)
-0.018
(0.072)
-0.784*
(0.42)
0.149
(0.451)

Time variant controls
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for other finance formulas,
implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and state average
student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits,
and unemployment rates.
Private School Vouchers
In order to further add to the literature regarding incentives for identification in special
education, we look specifically at what happens to enrollment in special education when a
special education voucher bill is enacted within a state. Winters and Greene (2009) found that
the McKay Scholarship in Florida reduced the identification of students for special education in
public schools. Chakrabarti (2013) found null effects of the voucher due to the contradictory
incentives involved in identifying students to exclude them from Florida’s high stakes
accountability system and then making the voucher program available to those students. No
Child Left Behind does not allow for the exclusion of students in special education, eliminating
this incentive to identify students after 2001. We present our results of the simple correlations
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for the year a special education voucher program was enacted and special education enrollment
in Table 10.
While there is no relationship between the enactment of a special education private
school voucher and overall enrollment in special education, there is an increase in students
identified as having a specific learning disability after such enactments, though this result is only
marginally significant. The magnitude of this relationship is about 0.5 percentage points, which,
given the size of most special education voucher programs, is quite large. There is a marginally
significant decrease in students identified with intellectual disabilities when special education
voucher programs are enacted.
Of importance is how students enrolled in a private school choice program are reported to
the state and federal government. Our counts of students in special education are based on IDEA
Part B counts, and students enrolled in special education private school choice programs no
longer have an active IEP in order to receive Part B funds. We, thus, work under the assumption
that all reported students counts do not include students enrolled in a special education voucher
program. These results may indicate that parents may be using special education identification
as having a specific learning disability as a mechanism for future enrollment in the private school
choice program, and those with intellectual disabilities are using the voucher to attend private
schools that the district is normally unwilling to pay for through the IEP process.
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Table 10: Difference in special education enrollments in states that enact a special education
voucher program compared to those that do not, 1991-2013
Enrollment in special education
Non-severe enrollment
Specific learning disabilities
Speech or language impairments
Other health impairments
Emotional disturbances
Intellectual disabilities
Severe enrollment
Multiple disabilities
Hearing impairments
Orthopedic impairments
Visual impairments
Autism
Deaf/blindness
Traumatic brain injury

-0.0005
(0.0028)
-0.0003
(0.0025)
0.0051**
(0.0025)
-0.0020
(0.0017)
-0.0013
(0.0010)
-0.0007
(0.0012)
-0.0017*
(0.0009)
-0.0011
(0.0008)
-0.0005
(0.0004)
0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0000)
-0.0006
(0.0004)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0000
(0.0001)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are fully specified
models to also include year fixed effects and controls for other finance
formulas, implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher
program, and state average student demographics (free or reduced lunch and
race), Social Security Income benefits, and unemployment rates. The omitted
funding formula is weighted funding.
We further investigate the legitimacy of this hypothesis in Table 11, which displays
results of enrollment in each educational placement for students in states that enact a voucher
program. Unsurprisingly, we see a decrease in public special day placements for students with
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severe and non-severe disabilities (including intellectual disabilities) and out of school
placements in general for students with severe disabilities. One can see this as shifts away from
public options for out of school placements to private options. Students who choose to stay in
the public school system are likely advocating for more private options and those who use the
special education voucher are doing so in order to opt into a private program rather than the
previously provided public option though their IEPs. These results demonstrate the way in
which special education private school choice programs may be able to function, as partially
intended, to empower parents to circumvent the IEP process in order to obtain the type of
educational services they desire for their students. The advent of a special education voucher
and opening the door to diverse private schools to parents of students with disabilities may
diminish the myth that private schools discriminate against students with disabilities.15 It is less
clear why we would see a very small (0.05 percentage point) increase in students with nonsevere disabilities in home/hospital placements.

15

There is variation across programs in the proportion of participating private schools that are specifically for
students with disabilities.
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Table 11: Differences in rates of various educational placements in states that enact a special
education voucher program compared to those that do not, 1991-2013
Inclusion >80%
Inclusion 40%-79%
Inclusion <40%
Out of school
Public special day school
Private special day school
Public residential school
Private residential school
Home/hospital

Non-severe w/ID
0.0232
-0.032
-0.0108
(0.0241)
-0.0145
(0.0146)
-0.0015
(0.0019)
-0.0051***
(0.0017)
0.0004
(0.0031)
0.0001
(0.0008)
0.0011
(0.0009)
0.0005**
(0.0002)

Severe w/out ID
-0.0023
(0.0030)
-0.0038*
(0.0022)
0.0011
(0.0022)
-0.0033**
(0.0013)
-0.0051***
(0.0010)
0.0005
(0.0006)
-0.0003
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0001)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models are fully specified models to
also include year fixed effects and controls for other finance formulas, implementation
of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and state average student
demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits, and
unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.
Discussion
In this study, we find null effects of changing to a capitation based from a prospective funding
system on overall special education enrollment. Disaggregated results show declines in nonsevere disabilities, in particular specific learning disabilities. Further analyses also show
decreases in students with non-severe disabilities enrolled in the most inclusive educational
placements and a marginally significant increase in the placement of students with severe
disabilities in public residential schools. We also analyze the correlations between the enactment
of voucher programs for special education on public school special education enrollments,
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finding increases in specific learning disabilities, decreases in intellectual disabilities, and rises in
private placement options.
Finance policies can be challenging because they have to balance true financial
constraints with what may be ideal in the world. Special education is often viewed as an area of
education that lives without financial constraint as a result of the individual entitlement in IDEA
to a free and appropriate education. Federal funds accompany IDEA, but 90 percent of special
education funding is born by state and local revenues. States have thus attempted to manage the
cost of special education through finance policies, balancing the various incentives that may
occur as a result of any one decision. Over the last two decades, some states chose to switch to
capitation based funding systems as a result. The formulas developed assume a homogenous
distribution of disability in general and disability types and severities specifically. There are
many reasons to believe this is not true whether due to environmental factors, such as pollution
or access to prenatal health care, or Tiebout Choice (Tiebout, 1956), drawing individuals with
children with disabilities to cities with more resources to support them. Creating heavy financial
burdens to schools to provide adequate educational services to students with disabilities may
result in higher long term costs for states that will be forced to support those individuals for years
to come through welfare programs.
Unconstrained financially, schools and parents alike may have reasons to identify
students as having a disability. Students can receive extra time on tests, be provided services to
help their progress, or be excluded from a classroom when disruptive. Conversely, students
without parents to advocate for them or those seen simply as behavior problems may not be
identified and provided these necessary services to enable their academic progress. The goal is
creating a balance through these policies.
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Implementation of capitation based systems is an old innovation now. States attempt to
create systems for allocating money that are simple to administer even if they are not best for
students. Some districts are now using their state allocations to better redistribute funds using
student based allocation schemes. Student based allocation is a set number of dollars assigned to
a student or student type that follows a student to any school they attend and offers school staff,
those closest to the student, the opportunity to cater services to the precise needs of the student
using their knowledge of all the strengths of the staff and understanding of the student’s family
and community.
Because evidence on the best ways to serve students in special education is mixed, it is
nearly impossible to determine what is the “right” way to serve a student. Not only is this
dependent on the individual needs of that student, but also on the various services available
within his or her educational setting. Student based allocation gives administrators the
confidence that funds can be used in diverse ways based on the actual student, which can in turn
empower them as an IEP team member and potentially eliminate the financial incentive to
underserve. Additionally, putting the funds under the control of the school creates an incentive
for them to serve the student at the lowest costs necessary since any reduction in spending would
allow the school to spend those funds in another way at the school level. With a strong
accountability system in place, this could result in a decrease in spending and an improvement in
student outcomes.
Student based allocation is increasingly being used by states and districts to allocate
public education funds across the country. Districts using student based allocation to allocate
funds to schools include Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Hartford, Houston,
Lawrence, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Nashville, New York City, Newark, the
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Recovery School District, and San Francisco. It is essential that researchers focus their energy
on how these locally run special education finance systems are implemented along with various
outcomes. Policies like these must constantly be evaluated and reevaluated in order to ensure
that they are having their intended impact, not unintended ones.
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Appendix
Appendix Figure 1: Capitation versus other funding systems and special education enrollment,
1991-2013 (Dhuey and Lispcomb definitions)

58

Appendix Table 1: Relationship between capitation funding formula and special education
enrollment, single state omission checks

State omitted
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

1991-2003
Time variant
No controls
controls
-0.0051
-0.0062*
-0.0041
-0.0056
-0.0048
-0.0059*
-0.0054
-0.0062*
-0.0042
-0.0053
-0.005
-0.0062*
-0.0036
-0.005
-0.0048
-0.0059*
-0.0046
-0.0057
-0.0047
-0.0059*
-0.005*
-0.0054
-0.0048
-0.0061
-0.0045
-0.0059*
-0.0046
-0.0059*
-0.0047
-0.0059*
-0.0047
-0.0059*
-0.0045
-0.006*
-0.0044
-0.0057
-0.0049
-0.006*
-0.0037
-0.0051
-0.0047
-0.0059*
-0.0047
-0.0059*
-0.005
-0.0061*
-0.005
-0.006*
-0.005
-0.0063
-0.0046
-0.006*
-0.0049
-0.006
-0.0044
-0.0056
-0.0037
-0.0054
-0.0046
-0.0052
-0.0047
-0.006
-0.0047
-0.0057
-0.0057
-0.0067*
-0.0049
-0.006
-0.0047
-0.0059
-0.0046
-0.0059
-0.0047
-0.0059
-0.0069***
-0.0089***
-0.0045
-0.0058
-0.0045
-0.0059
-0.005
-0.006*
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1991-2013
Time variant
No controls
controls
-0.0051
-0.005
-0.004
-0.0036
-0.0045
-0.0045
-0.0051
-0.0048
-0.0042
-0.0048
-0.0049
-0.0048
-0.003
-0.003
-0.0046
-0.0046
-0.0044
-0.0044
-0.0045
-0.0045
-0.0048
-0.0044
-0.0044
-0.0042
-0.0042
-0.0045
-0.0045
-0.0044
-0.0044
-0.0042
-0.0044
-0.0046
-0.0044
-0.0045
-0.0041
-0.0043
-0.0051
-0.0056
-0.0039
-0.004
-0.0044
-0.0046
-0.0043
-0.0048
-0.0047
-0.0047
-0.0048
-0.0047
-0.0046
-0.0046
-0.0044
-0.0045
-0.0046
-0.0045
-0.0039
-0.0038
-0.004
-0.0047
-0.0046
-0.0048
-0.0043
-0.0039
-0.0046
-0.0047
-0.0061*
-0.0062
-0.0045
-0.0048
-0.0043
-0.0044
-0.0044
-0.0045
-0.0042
-0.0042
-0.0061**
-0.0068**
-0.0044
-0.0046
-0.0038
-0.004
-0.005
-0.005

Appendix Table 2: Relationship between capitation funding formula and special education
enrollment, single state omission checks (cont.)
1991-2003
1991-2003
Time variant
Time variant
State omitted
No controls
controls
No controls controls
Texas
-0.0049
-0.0061*
-0.0049
-0.005
Utah
-0.0048
-0.006*
-0.0047
-0.0046
Vermont
-0.005
-0.0061*
-0.0046
-0.0048
Virginia
-0.0047
-0.0059*
-0.0046
-0.0047
Washington
-0.0048
-0.0059*
-0.0045
-0.0042
Washington D.C.
-0.0041
-0.0036
-0.0037
-0.0022
West Virginia
-0.0044
-0.005
-0.0043
-0.0042
Wisconsin
-0.0046
-0.0053
-0.0043
-0.0041
Wyoming
-0.0049
-0.0063*
-0.0046
-0.0047
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for state average Social Security
Income benefits and unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.
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Appendix Table 3: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb linear model estimating a change to a
capitation system
1991-2003

Capitation formula

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0113***
(0.0038)

-0.011***
(0.0037)
0.0016
(0.0018)
-0.0031
(0.0022)
0.0329
(0.0198)
-0.0708
(0.1090)
-0.0714*
(0.0423)
0.0043
(0.0919)
0.1075***
(0.0219)

-0.0109***
(0.004)

0.1059***
(0.0013)

-0.0098**
(0.0042)
0.0031
(0.0031)
-0.0001
(0.0024)
0.0282*
(0.0167)
0.1317**
(0.0652)
-0.0723**
(0.0307)
0.0247***
(0.0089)
0.0978***
(0.0232)

604
50
0.6333
-0.011***
(0.0037)

1,173
51
0.2682
-0.0109***
(0.004)

1,104
50
0.3665
-0.0098**
(0.0042)

Voucher program
Accountability
Court win
Free/reduced lunch
Black
Hispanic
Other race

1991-2013

0.1069***
(0.0009)

Constant
650
50

Observations
0.6177
Number of states
-0.0113***
Adj. R-squared
(0.0038)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for state average Social Security
Income benefits and unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted
funding.
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Appendix Table 4: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb non-severe and severe enrollment under a capitation funding system
Non-severe w/out ID
(1)
(2)
Capitation formula

-0.0102**
(0.0041)

Accountability
Court Win
Free/reduced lunch
Black
Hispanic
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Other race
Constant

0.0888***
(0.0012)

-0.0104**
(0.0039)
0.0013
(0.0028)
0.0001
(0.0021)
0.0315**
(0.0146)
0.0400
(0.0562)
-0.0868***
(0.0308)
0.0115
(0.0089)
0.0841**
(0.0314)

Non-severe w/ID
(3)
(4)
-0.0113***
(0.0042)

0.1015***
(0.0014)

-0.0109**
(0.0045)
0.0029
(0.0031)
0.0012
(0.0022)
0.0269*
(0.0159)
0.1143*
(0.0596)
-0.0629**
(0.0292)
0.0114
(0.0096)
0.1081***
(0.0335)

Severe w/ID
(5)
(6)
0.0002
(0.0017)

0.0005
(0.0017)
0.0009
(0.0015)
0.0012
(0.0009)
-0.0119
(0.0076)
0.1255***
(0.0374)
0.0138
(0.0144)
0.0069*
(0.0036)
0.0188***
0.0194
(0.0007)
(0.0195)

Severe w/out ID
(7)
(8)
0.0023
(0.0015)

0.0025
(0.0016)
-0.0006
(0.0005)
0.0001
(0.0006)
-0.0058
(0.0041)
0.0419
(0.0261)
-0.0102
(0.0098)
0.0063**
(0.0027)
0.0063*** -0.0038
(0.0006)
(0.0211)

Observations
1,117
1,073
1,116
1,072
1,020
981
1,021
982
Number of states
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
Adj. R-squared
0.3430
0.3832
0.3781
0.4149
0.1463
0.2550
0.6184
0.6481
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully specified models (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8)
also include controls for state average Social Security Income benefits and unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is
weighted funding.

Appendix Table 5: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb enrollment by disability category for
capitation based funding systems

Non-Severe Disabilities

1991-2003

Specific learning disabilities
Speech/ language impairments
Emotional disturbance
Other health impairments
Intellectual disabilities
Multiple disabilities

Severe Disabilities

Hearing impairments
Orthopedic impairments
Visual impairments
Autism
Deaf/blindness
Traumatic brain injury

1991-2013

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0058**
(0.0027)
-0.0002
(0.0017)
-0.001
(0.0015)
-0.0032**
(0.0013)
-0.001
(0.0007)
-0.0004
(0.0007)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0001)

-0.0054**
(0.0027)
-0.0002
(0.0014)
-0.001
(0.0014)
-0.0037***
(0.001)
-0.0008
(0.0008)
-0.0003
(0.0011)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0001)

-0.0072**
(0.003)
0.0001
(0.0019)
-0.0005
(0.0018)
-0.0045***
(0.0016)
0.0007
(0.0011)
-0.0004
(0.0009)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0004
(0.0005)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0002)

-0.0057
(0.0035)
0.0001
(0.002)
-0.0003
(0.0016)
-0.0054***
(0.0012)
0.0006
(0.001)
-0.0001
(0.0013)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0003
(0.0005)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0002)

Time variant controls
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for other finance formulas,
implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and state average
student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits, and
unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.
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Appendix Table 6: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb enrollment in educational placements when states change to a capitation
funding system
Non Severe w/Intellectual Disabilities
1991-2003
1991-2013
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Inclusion >80%
Inclusion 40%-79%
Inclusion <40%
Out of school
Public special day
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Private special day
Public residential
Private residential
Home/hospital

-0.0575
(0.0433)
0.0432
(0.0329)
0.0171
(0.0144)
0.0059*
(0.0031)
0.0054*
(0.0028)
0.0000
(0.0014)
0.0003
(0.0009)
0.0006
(0.001)
-0.0002
(0.0005)

-0.0504
(0.0449)
0.0376
(0.0345)
0.021
(0.0158)
0.0048
(0.0035)
0.0000
(0.0026)
-0.0004
(0.0014)
0.0007
(0.001)
0.0004
(0.0009)
-0.0001
(0.0006)

-0.0808**
(0.0329)
0.0487*
(0.0257)
0.0328**
(0.0135)
0.0065**
(0.0029)
0.0062**
(0.0028)
-0.0015
(0.0018)
0.0005
(0.0008)
0.0012
(0.0009)
-0.0002
(0.0004)

-0.0721**
(0.0347)
0.0402
(0.0289)
0.0414***
(0.0146)
0.0063*
(0.0034)
0.0045
(0.0031)
-0.0013
(0.0019)
0.0009
(0.0008)
0.0011
(0.0008)
0.0000
(0.0005)

Severe w/out Intellectual Disabilities
1991-2003
1991-2013
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-0.0028
-0.0015
(0.0029)
(0.0031)
0.001
0.0017
(0.0027)
(0.0036)
-0.0002
0.0004
(0.0025)
(0.0031)
0.0038
0.0034
(0.0027)
(0.0028)
0.0024
0.0025
(0.0021)
(0.0022)
-0.0009
-0.0013
(0.0009)
(0.001)
0.0019**
0.0019*
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0001
0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)

0.0000
0.002
(0.0033)
(0.003)
0.0021
0.0036
(0.0033) (0.0043)
0.0012
0.0022
(0.0024) (0.0031)
0.0044
0.0039
(0.0029) (0.0031)
0.0023
0.002
(0.0028)
(0.003)
-0.0001
-0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0006)
0.0017** 0.0016*
(0.0008) (0.0008)
0.0005*** 0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
0.0002
0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)

Time variant controls
X
X
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully specified models (Columns 2, 4, 6, and
8) also include controls for other finance formulas, implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and
state average student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits, and unemployment rates.
The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.

Appendix Table 7: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb resource allocation changes under
capitation funding systems
1991-2003
(1)
(2)
Pupil-teacher ratio
Ln(enrollment)
Ln(teacher salaries)
Total Revenues ($1000's/pupil)
Federal
State
Local

0.023
(0.45)
-0.0032
(0.0334)
-0.0148
(0.0395)
-0.684
(0.599)
0.0725*
(0.0429)
-1.418**
(0.689)
0.662
(0.422)

-0.0144
(0.486)
0.0067
(0.0248)
-0.0116
(0.0341)
-0.65
(0.501)
0.0428
(0.0446)
-1.461**
(0.638)
0.769*
(0.422)

1991-2013
(3)
(4)
0.367
(0.4)
-0.0145
(0.0443)
-0.0013
(0.0504)
-0.633*
(0.375)
0.0807
(0.0667)
-1.04**
(0.487)
0.325
(0.416)

0.585
(0.531)
0.0116
(0.038)
-0.0028
(0.0529)
-1.271**
(0.536)
0.0502
(0.0578)
-1.596**
(0.637)
0.275
(0.491)

Time variant controls
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for other finance formulas,
implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and state average
student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits,
and unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.
Appendix Table 8: Relationship between capitation funding formula and special education
enrollment, single state omission checks

State omitted
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii

1991-2003
Time variant
No controls
controls
-0.0113**
-0.0109**
-0.0116***
-0.0114***
-0.0119***
-0.0119***
-0.0114***
-0.011***
-0.0114**
-0.0117**
-0.0115***
-0.0113***
-0.0097**
-0.0093***
-0.0114***
-0.011***
-0.0111***
-0.0108***
-0.0113***
-0.0113***
-0.0111***
-0.0102***
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1991-2013
Time variant
No controls
controls
-0.0113**
-0.0091*
-0.0113***
-0.0102**
-0.0118***
-0.0105**
-0.0109***
-0.0098**
-0.0115**
-0.0127***
-0.0111***
-0.0099**
-0.0084**
-0.0075**
-0.0109***
-0.0098**
-0.0108**
-0.0096**
-0.0111***
-0.0109**
-0.0107**
-0.0097**

Appendix Table 7: Relationship between capitation funding formula and special education
enrollment, single state omission checks (Cont.)
1991-2003
Time variant
State omitted
No controls
controls
Idaho
-0.012***
-0.012***
Illinois
-0.0114***
-0.0111***
Indiana
-0.0112***
-0.011***
Iowa
-0.0113***
-0.011***
Kansas
-0.0113***
-0.011***
Kentucky
-0.0114***
-0.0111***
Louisiana
-0.0112***
-0.0111***
Maine
-0.0111***
-0.0107***
Maryland
-0.0115***
-0.0111***
Massachusetts
-0.0097**
-0.0096**
Michigan
-0.0113***
-0.011***
Minnesota
-0.0113***
-0.011***
Mississippi
-0.0114***
-0.0112***
Missouri
-0.0116***
-0.0113***
Montana
-0.0125***
-0.0121***
Nebraska
-0.0112***
-0.0109***
Nevada
-0.0114***
-0.011***
New Hampshire
-0.0113***
-0.011***
New Jersey
-0.0123***
-0.0122***
New Mexico
-0.0112***
-0.0105***
New York
-0.0113***
-0.011***
North Carolina
-0.0113***
-0.011***
North Dakota
-0.0133***
-0.0126***
Ohio
-0.0114***
-0.0111***
Oklahoma
-0.0113***
-0.011***
Oregon
-0.0113***
-0.0111***
Pennsylvania
-0.0114***
-0.011***
Rhode Island
-0.0089***
-0.0084***
South Carolina
-0.0112***
-0.0109***
South Dakota
-0.0114***
-0.0115***
Tennessee
-0.0115***
-0.011***
Texas
-0.0114***
-0.0111***
Utah
-0.0115***
-0.0113***
Vermont
-0.0113***
-0.011***
Virginia
-0.0113***
-0.011***
Washington
-0.0114***
-0.011***
West Virginia
-0.0111***
-0.0106***
Wisconsin
-0.0112***
-0.0105***
Wyoming
-0.0115***
-0.0114***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1991-2013
Time variant
No controls
controls
-0.0109**
-0.0095**
-0.0109***
-0.0097**
-0.0107**
-0.0098**
-0.0109***
-0.0096**
-0.0108**
-0.0096**
-0.0109***
-0.0099**
-0.0108**
-0.0098**
-0.0106**
-0.0095**
-0.0111***
-0.0103**
-0.01**
-0.0088**
-0.0108**
-0.0098**
-0.0107**
-0.01**
-0.011***
-0.0099**
-0.0112***
-0.0101**
-0.0116**
-0.0101**
-0.0108**
-0.0097**
-0.011***
-0.0099**
-0.0101**
-0.0092**
-0.0117***
-0.0104**
-0.0109***
-0.0097**
-0.0107**
-0.0092**
-0.011***
-0.0098**
-0.0134***
-0.0122***
-0.0109***
-0.0099**
-0.0108**
-0.0097**
-0.0109***
-0.0099**
-0.0107**
-0.0094**
-0.0091**
-0.0081**
-0.0108***
-0.0098**
-0.0108***
-0.0098**
-0.0111***
-0.01**
-0.0111***
-0.0099**
-0.0111***
-0.0099**
-0.011***
-0.0103**
-0.0109***
-0.0098**
-0.0109***
-0.0096**
-0.0108**
-0.0096**
-0.0108**
-0.0096**
-0.011***
-0.01**

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for state average Social Security
Income benefits and unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.

Appendix Table 9: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb linear model estimating a change to a
capitation system
1991-2003

Capitation formula

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0113***
(0.0038)

-0.011***
(0.0037)
0.0016
(0.0018)
-0.0031
(0.0022)
0.0329
(0.0198)
-0.0708
(0.1090)
-0.0714*
(0.0423)
0.0043
(0.0919)
0.1075***
(0.0219)

-0.0109***
(0.004)

0.1059***
(0.0013)

-0.0098**
(0.0042)
0.0031
(0.0031)
-0.0001
(0.0024)
0.0282*
(0.0167)
0.1317**
(0.0652)
-0.0723**
(0.0307)
0.0247***
(0.0089)
0.0978***
(0.0232)

604
50
0.6333
-0.011***
(0.0037)

1,173
51
0.2682
-0.0109***
(0.004)

1,104
50
0.3665
-0.0098**
(0.0042)

Voucher program
Accountability
Court win
Free/reduced lunch
Black
Hispanic
Other race

1991-2013

0.1069***
(0.0009)

Constant
650
50

Observations
0.6177
Number of states
-0.0113***
Adj. R-squared
(0.0038)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for state average Social Security
Income benefits and unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted
funding.
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Appendix Table 10: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb non-severe and severe enrollment under a capitation funding system
Non-severe w/out ID
(1)
(2)
Capitation formula

-0.0102**
(0.0041)

Accountability
Court Win
Free/reduced lunch
Black
Hispanic
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Other race
Constant

0.0888***
(0.0012)

-0.0104**
(0.0039)
0.0013
(0.0028)
0.0001
(0.0021)
0.0315**
(0.0146)
0.0400
(0.0562)
-0.0868***
(0.0308)
0.0115
(0.0089)
0.0841**
(0.0314)

Non-severe w/ID
(3)
(4)
-0.0113***
(0.0042)

0.1015***
(0.0014)

-0.0109**
(0.0045)
0.0029
(0.0031)
0.0012
(0.0022)
0.0269*
(0.0159)
0.1143*
(0.0596)
-0.0629**
(0.0292)
0.0114
(0.0096)
0.1081***
(0.0335)

Severe w/ID
(5)
(6)
0.0002
(0.0017)

0.0188***
(0.0007)

0.0005
(0.0017)
0.0009
(0.0015)
0.0012
(0.0009)
-0.0119
(0.0076)
0.1255***
(0.0374)
0.0138
(0.0144)
0.0069*
(0.0036)
0.0194
(0.0195)

Severe w/out ID
(7)
(8)
0.0023
(0.0015)

0.0063***
(0.0006)

0.0025
(0.0016)
-0.0006
(0.0005)
0.0001
(0.0006)
-0.0058
(0.0041)
0.0419
(0.0261)
-0.0102
(0.0098)
0.0063**
(0.0027)
-0.0038
(0.0211)

Observations
1,117
1,073
1,116
1,072
1,020
981
1,021
982
Number of states
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
Adj. R-squared
0.3430
0.3832
0.3781
0.4149
0.1463
0.2550
0.6184
0.6481
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully specified models (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) also
include controls for state average Social Security Income benefits and unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted
funding.

Appendix Table 11: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb enrollment by disability category for
capitation based funding systems

Non-Severe Disabilities

1991-2003

Specific learning disabilities
Speech/ language impairments
Emotional disturbance
Other health impairments
Intellectual disabilities
Multiple disabilities

Severe Disabilities

Hearing impairments
Orthopedic impairments
Visual impairments
Autism
Deaf/blindness
Traumatic brain injury

1991-2013

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0058**
(0.0027)
-0.0002
(0.0017)
-0.001
(0.0015)
-0.0032**
(0.0013)
-0.001
(0.0007)
-0.0004
(0.0007)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0002
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0001)

-0.0054**
(0.0027)
-0.0002
(0.0014)
-0.001
(0.0014)
-0.0037***
(0.001)
-0.0008
(0.0008)
-0.0003
(0.0011)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0001)

-0.0072**
(0.003)
0.0001
(0.0019)
-0.0005
(0.0018)
-0.0045***
(0.0016)
0.0007
(0.0011)
-0.0004
(0.0009)
0.0000
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0001)
-0.0004
(0.0005)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0002)

-0.0057
(0.0035)
0.0001
(0.002)
-0.0003
(0.0016)
-0.0054***
(0.0012)
0.0006
(0.001)
-0.0001
(0.0013)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0003
(0.0005)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0002)

Time variant controls
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for other finance formulas,
implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and state average
student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits, and
unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.
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Appendix Table 12: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb enrollment in educational placements when states change to a capitation
funding system
Non Severe w/Intellectual Disabilities
1991-2003
1991-2013
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Inclusion >80%
Inclusion 40%-79%
Inclusion <40%
Out of school
Public special day
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Private special day
Public residential
Private residential
Home/hospital

-0.0575
(0.0433)
0.0432
(0.0329)
0.0171
(0.0144)
0.0059*
(0.0031)
0.0054*
(0.0028)
0.0000
(0.0014)
0.0003
(0.0009)
0.0006
(0.001)
-0.0002
(0.0005)

-0.0504
(0.0449)
0.0376
(0.0345)
0.021
(0.0158)
0.0048
(0.0035)
0.0000
(0.0026)
-0.0004
(0.0014)
0.0007
(0.001)
0.0004
(0.0009)
-0.0001
(0.0006)

-0.0808**
(0.0329)
0.0487*
(0.0257)
0.0328**
(0.0135)
0.0065**
(0.0029)
0.0062**
(0.0028)
-0.0015
(0.0018)
0.0005
(0.0008)
0.0012
(0.0009)
-0.0002
(0.0004)

-0.0721**
(0.0347)
0.0402
(0.0289)
0.0414***
(0.0146)
0.0063*
(0.0034)
0.0045
(0.0031)
-0.0013
(0.0019)
0.0009
(0.0008)
0.0011
(0.0008)
0.0000
(0.0005)

Severe w/out Intellectual Disabilities
1991-2003
1991-2013
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-0.0028
-0.0015
(0.0029)
(0.0031)
0.001
0.0017
(0.0027)
(0.0036)
-0.0002
0.0004
(0.0025)
(0.0031)
0.0038
0.0034
(0.0027)
(0.0028)
0.0024
0.0025
(0.0021)
(0.0022)
-0.0009
-0.0013
(0.0009)
(0.001)
0.0019**
0.0019*
(0.0008)
(0.0009)
0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
0.0001
0.0001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)

0.0000
0.002
(0.0033)
(0.003)
0.0021
0.0036
(0.0033) (0.0043)
0.0012
0.0022
(0.0024) (0.0031)
0.0044
0.0039
(0.0029) (0.0031)
0.0023
0.002
(0.0028)
(0.003)
-0.0001
-0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0006)
0.0017** 0.0016*
(0.0008) (0.0008)
0.0005*** 0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
0.0002
0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)

Time variant controls
X
X
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully specified models (Columns 2, 4, 6, and
8) also include controls for other finance formulas, implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and
state average student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits, and unemployment rates.
The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.

Appendix Table 13: Replication of Dhuey and Lipscomb resource allocation changes under
capitation funding systems
1991-2003
(1)
(2)
Pupil-teacher ratio
Ln(enrollment)
Ln(teacher salaries)
Total Revenues ($1000's/pupil)
Federal
State
Local

0.023
(0.45)
-0.0032
(0.0334)
-0.0148
(0.0395)
-0.684
(0.599)
0.0725*
(0.0429)
-1.418**
(0.689)
0.662
(0.422)

-0.0144
(0.486)
0.0067
(0.0248)
-0.0116
(0.0341)
-0.65
(0.501)
0.0428
(0.0446)
-1.461**
(0.638)
0.769*
(0.422)

1991-2013
(3)
(4)
0.367
(0.4)
-0.0145
(0.0443)
-0.0013
(0.0504)
-0.633*
(0.375)
0.0807
(0.0667)
-1.04**
(0.487)
0.325
(0.416)

0.585
(0.531)
0.0116
(0.038)
-0.0028
(0.0529)
-1.271**
(0.536)
0.0502
(0.0578)
-1.596**
(0.637)
0.275
(0.491)

Time variant controls
X
X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year fixed effects. Fully
specified models (Columns 2 and 4) also include controls for other finance formulas,
implementation of a state accountability system and/or voucher program, and state average
student demographics (free or reduced lunch and race), Social Security Income benefits,
and unemployment rates. The omitted funding formula is weighted funding.
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Chapter 2
Falling Below the Line: Minimum Subgroup Size and Special Education Enrollment
Introduction
With the passage of the All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, and finally the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) in
1997 and renewed in 2004, guaranteeing a free and appropriate education (FAPE) for students
with disabilities in public schools, special education enrollment has continued to grow across the
country. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) mandated the inclusion of students
with disabilities in the attainment of 100 percent proficiency and progress on annual measureable
objectives (AMOs) for schools to make annual yearly progress (AYP) and avoid sanctions. For
statistical reliability, each state determined a minimum subgroup size for the calculation of
progress toward subgroup AMOs. Schools without a sufficiently large number of students in a
subgroup were not held accountable for the progress of those students in the determination of
AYP. The academic challenges encountered by students with disabilities may lead schools to
have an incentive to manipulate the number of students in this subgroup in order to fall below the
minimum subgroup size and avoid including these students in AYP. If schools respond to this
incentive to avoid including the special education subgroup, there will be a clustering of schools
just below the cutoff and then a large drop in the number of schools right at or above the cutoff.
Identification of Students
The decision to identify a student as having a disability begins the referral for assessment
primarily made by students’ parent(s) or school staff. This assessment process is completed,
typically, by the school psychologist and a special educator,16 and must occur within 60 days of

16

The individuals involved in assessments varies based on the type of disability and expertise needed. Medical
professionals may also be involved, particularly for physical disabilities.
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when the referral was made. Assessment results alone cannot be used to determine a student’s
eligibility for special education. An Individual Education Program (IEP) team composed of the
student’s parent, a general educator, special educator, and school or district administrator meet to
review the results of the assessment and make a final determination.
Controversy over the process of identifying a student as having a disability and
qualifying for special education services primarily surrounds “fuzzy” disabilities. These are
disabilities that are less clearly detectible, such as specific learning disabilities, speech or
language impairments, other health impairments, and emotional disturbance. Assessment results
may not provide definite guidance for the IEP team, which then exercises its discretion over
students who lay on the margin of qualifying for special education. For example, the standard
practice used for qualifying as having a specific learning disability is a 1.5 standard deviation
discrepancy between a student’s cognitive ability and academic achievement assessments. While
this line appears clear between eligibility and not, the members of the IEP team can still make
the determination that a student receive services, particularly if the student’s scores sit on the
margin of this qualification. In his book Distinguishing Disability, Colin Dean (2009)
documents the way in which levels of wealth and parental education create a divide in the
amount of power parents hold on an IEP team, particularly in these eligibility decisions.
Chambers, Parrish, & Hikido (1996) interviewed special education directors as part of their
evaluation of Pennsylvania’s funding system change. The directors felt that the lack of rigidity
in the regulations for determining eligibility for special education services resulted in an
increased number of parental requests for services.
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Competing Incentives
NCLB was the first federal law to mandate the accountability of schools through
standardized testing with a goal of 100 percent of students reaching proficiency by the year 2014.
Some states implemented high stakes accountability systems independently prior to the passage
of NCLB (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005), and the special education community responded in the
1997 and 2004 reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) by requiring the
inclusion of students with disabilities in state assessments to the same extent as their nondisabled peers.17 NCLB, unlike many of the state systems, included the accountability of schools
to specific subgroups, including students with disabilities, in their calculations for whether a
school made annual yearly progress (AYP) on measurable objectives (No Child Left Behind Act,
2001). The special education subgroup is composed only of students identified as actually having
a qualifying disability defined in IDEA through the IEP process (Harr-Robbins et al, 2013).
Accordingly, NCLB allowed for states to individually determine aspects of its
implementation, such as the minimum size of subgroups included in calculating AYP. These
subgroups sizes were to be determined in order for aggregate test results to be statistically
reliable as well as to protect personally identifiable information.18 States determined group sizes
in a balance between achieving statistical reliability and holding as many schools accountable for
their subgroups as possible (Rouse & McLaughlin, 2007). On average, most states chose a
minimum subgroup size of 30 or 40 (Harr-Robbins et al, 2013).19 Some states created higher
minimum subgroup sizes (e.g. California) for students with disabilities than other subgroups in
order to compensate for the statistical reliability concerns surrounding the group’s heterogeneity

17

34 CFR § 300.157
20 USC § 6311 (b)(2)(C)
19
Chardichon (2016) updated state minimum subgroup sizes. By this time, some states, such as Arkansas, reduced
their minimum subgroup size.
18
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(Erpenbach, Forte-Fast, & Potts, 2003). If schools did not enroll a sufficient number of students
with disabilities to meet the minimum subgroup size for AYP calculation, they were not held
accountable for this subgroup. In 2009-10, only 35 percent of public schools were held
accountable for the subgroup of students with disabilities. These trends in holding students in
special education accountable varies by elementary (32 percent), middle (62 percent), and high
school (23 percent) (Harr-Robbins et al, 2013). The use of a raw number rather than percentage
of enrollment to determine the minimum subgroup size results in a high correlation exists
between a school’s overall student enrollment and the number of subgroups for which it is
accountable (Kiplinger, 2008; Porter, Linn, & Trimble, 2005).
The expectation under NCLB was that the subgroup of students with disabilities could
make proportional progress to other subgroups using annual measureable objectives (AMOs).
Evidence by Eckes and Wando (2009) suggests that the gains for students with disabilities are
substantially smaller than those of other students. Moreover, NCLB’s requirement for 100
percent proficiency for each subgroup was particularly difficult for students with disabilities
who, on average, start at a lower proficiency rate, making their annual targets much larger and
less attainable than their non-disabled peers (Harr-Robbins et al, 2013). These increased
challenges for students with disabilities to meet their AMOs likely exacerbated the principalagent problem that surrounds many accountability systems. The inability to meet the goals of the
principal (the federal government) creates an incentive for the principals (schools) to manipulate
the subgroup composition in order to avoid sanctions.20

20

Cullen and Reback (2006) outline the way in which gaming through student status labeling may occur when
educators perceive an accountability system as “unfair.” To compensate for this unfairness, teachers may
strategically “teach to the test” or explicitly cheat. Manipulation of classification statuses may also occur when
certain groups receive exemptions or benefits in testing (Chakrabarti, 2013; Figlio & Getzler, 2002).
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The role of the IEP team
IEP teams are given several options for test taking for students with disabilities under
NCLB. Students can take the regular assessment with or without accommodations, a modified
assessment, or an alternative assessment.21 There is no limit to the number of students who can
take regular assessments with or without accommodations. All testing accommodations are
determined by the IEP team in consult with authorized accommodations for the assessment
taken.22 In May 2005, a temporary policy stated that schools that did not meet AYP solely due to
the achievement of students with disabilities would not be penalized if they could still show
evidence of progress for the students with disabilities (Elledge, Le Floch, Taylor & Anderson,
2009). The policy allowed schools to determine a “proxy” for proficiency rate for students with
disabilities based on 2 percent of all assessed students. This proxy was then applied to the
number of students with disabilities to determine proficiency for the purposes of meeting AYP.
While this “proxy” was utilized by many states, other states chose to create an assessment
based on modified achievement standards for 2 percent of test takers in the school. Many of the
states that chose this approach had a larger number of schools missing AYP due to the subgroup
of students with disabilities. The cost of developing such an assessment had to be warranted by a
high enough need in a state for its creation (Elledge et al, 2009). Finally, NCLB required that all
states create an assessment based on alternative achievement standards for 1 percent of students
with the most significant cognitive impairments.
These various means for assessing students with disabilities under NCLB were attempts
to increase accessibility and inclusion of students with disabilities in accountability systems. The
21

Parents of students with IEPs can also opt out of testing in the same manner as their non-disabled peers.
The Smarter Balance Assessment Consortium provides a detailed document describing the various times of
accommodations that are available. They delineate them as “universal tools,” “designed supports,” and
“accommodations” based on individual’s eligibility to receive them. http://www.smarterbalanced.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/SmarterBalanced_Guidelines.pdf
22
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use of alternative calculations of proficiency also significantly decreased the number of schools
not meeting AYP due solely to students with disabilities (Elledge et al., 2009). Consequently,
these options may have also eliminated some of the incentives that existed previously in
accountability systems to identify low achieving or poorly behaved students as having a
disability in order to exclude them from accountability (Chakrabarti, 2012; Cullen & Reback,
2006; Figlio & Getzler, 2002).
Prior Literature
Accountability Incentives
Several studies evaluated the impact of an accountability system on special education
enrollment rates. Figlio and Getzler (2002) analyzed student level data in Florida, finding lower
performing and lower income students were more likely to be identified as having a disability
when the new accountability system was put in place, likely in order to exclude them from
accountability testing. This was particularly true at lower income and lower performing schools
that were potentially at risk of being labeled as a failing school under the new system (Figlio &
Getzler, 2002). These findings indicate that schools react to incentives created by broader
policies, which can unintentionally result in changes in special education identification practices.
Chakrabarti (2013) also found that exemptions under Florida’s accountability system resulted in
increased labeling of students as limited English proficient (LEP).23 Hanushek and Raymond
(2005) analyzed the relationship between high-stakes accountability systems and special
education enrollment without statistically significant findings. Similarly, Greene and Forster
(2002) and Dhuey and Lipscomb (2011) included a variable for measuring the relationship

23

Chakrabarti (2013) also analyzed identification in special education under the accountability system, but the
timing of accountability policy occurred simultaneously with the implementation of the McKay Scholarship for
Students with Disabilities Program that created an incentive for public schools not to identify students for special
education, which would make the eligible for the private school voucher.
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between high-stakes state accountability systems and special education enrollment in their
analysis without statistically significant findings. Unlike Figlio and Getzler’s analyses, these
other studies used aggregated state-level data and looked across states rather than student-level
data in one state, potentially masking some of the individual changes that occurred within
schools and/or within states.
Minimum Subgroup Size
Little empirical research exists on the effect that a state’s minimum subgroup size may
have on students with disabilities. In Florida, students with certain disabilities could be
completely exempted from the state accountability testing. (Figlio & Getzler, 2002) found that
schools were more likely to identify low income and low achieving students as having a
disability with the introduction of the state’s accountability system. In particular, schools that
were closer to being considered a failing school participated more heavily in these practices.
Similarly, Cullen and Reback (2006) found that schools that had higher incentives to improve
test scores on state achievement tests were significantly more likely to identify students as in an
exempt group, such as students with disabilities, for test taking purposes. Research by Wei
(2012b) used regression discontinuity design to analyze the effect of the introduction of school
accountability on student achievement. This research found no evidence of improved
achievement for these students with disabilities. Furthermore, use of more stringent
accountability pressures, including a lower minimum subgroup size, only resulted in increased
achievement for Hispanic students (Wei, 2012a).
While No Child Left Behind (NCLB) allowed for flexibility by states in the
implementation around specific components of the law, differences in state failure rates were
strongly related to achievement targets and other variations determined by the states (Davidson,
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Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2013). Specifically, fewer schools made AYP in states with a
larger percent of schools held accountable for the students with disabilities subgroup (Davidson
et al, 2013, Harr-Robbins et al, 2013). Further analysis by Cronin, Dahlin, Xiang, and McCahon
(2009) found that only 6 percent of elementary and 3 percent of middle schools met their Annual
Measureable Objectives (AMOs) for their special education subgroups. Accordingly, elementary
schools were far more likely (49 percent) not to have the special education subgroup be included
in annual yearly progress (AYP) determinations than middles schools (18 percent) because of not
meeting the minimum subgroup size. States also mitigated some of these effects by using
confidence intervals to demonstrate a lack a statistical reliability in their AYP calculations when
they had high rates of students in special education (Harr-Robbins et al, 2013). There seem to be
clear incentives for states to alter minimum subgroup requirements as well as schools to change
their identification practices in order to avoid the high probability that their school will fail to
make AYP due to the special education subgroup.
Funding Incentives
Funding incentives can also play a role in the identification practices by schools. Greene
and Forster (2002) categorized systems as either a capitation or prospective funding system.
They found that over a ten year period, a state with a prospective system saw a 1.24 percentage
point increase in special education enrollment (Greene & Forster, 2002). Mahitivanichcha and
Parrish (2005) re-analyzed Greene and Forster’s with a poverty measure, and found that the
effect of a changing to a capitation system from prospective on special education enrollment was
somewhat weaker than the prior analyses (Mahitivanichcha & Parrish, 2005).
The most recent study to quantitatively analyze the relationship between a state’s special
education funding system and the enrollment of students in special education was published in
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2011 by Dhuey and Lipscomb. They employed a state level fixed effects model utilizing states
that changed from one system to another during the period of 1991-2000. This research found
about a 1.24 percentage point decrease in special education enrollment when states switched
from a prospective to a capitation system.
Applying the methodology and theory used by prior research, the current study fills the
gap in literature around the identification practices of students with disabilities based on the
minimum subgroup size used for AYP. Specifically, yearly changes in special education
enrollment will be analyzed to determine the relationship between a school falling below the
minimum subgroup size the prior year and its rate of special education identification. The next
section will detail the research methodology, followed by the analytic strategy utilized. The
results section will demonstrate how schools in Arkansas responded to the minimum subgroup
requirement for students in special education. Finally, we will discuss the implications from the
results of this study and where future research should continue.
Research Methodology
Data Description
All data utilized were obtained for the years 2004-05 to 2013-14 through two publicly
accessible sources, the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE) Data Center and the Office of
Education Policy at the University of Arkansas.24 The number of students who were limited
English proficient (LEP), male, free and reduced lunch, special education, gifted and talented,
and had a 504 plan were obtained from the ADE Data Center. School-level percentages were
then calculated based on the school’s total enrollment. School-level (elementary, middle, high
school) and type (magnet, alternative, or neither) were also obtained from the ADE Data Center.

24

Data from the Office of Education Policy is obtained from the publicly available data through the ADE Data
Center. For ease of calculation and formatting, this source was utilized instead of directly from the ADE.
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The percent of students in each racial category, percent of students scoring proficient or
advanced on state assessment by subject, a school Poverty Index,25 and region in the state were
obtained from the Office of Education Policy. Arkansas administered Benchmark exams in math
and literacy to students in grade 3-8 and End of Course (EOC) assessments in algebra, biology,
geometry, and literacy (11the grade only) to students in high school. Algebra and geometry
proficiency and advanced rates were aggregated to create a math percent proficient and advanced
rate. Biology results were not utilized in this analysis. Data from both the ADE Data Center and
Office of Education Policy were matched to schools using school identification numbers.
Sample
A total of 1,340 schools in Arkansas compose our sample enrolling about 460,000
students annually from 2004-05 to 2013-14. Approximately one third of schools in the state are
located in the northwest region of the state with another quarter in the northeast and central
regions. The remaining 20 percent of schools were located in the southwest (13 percent) and
southeast (7 percent) regions of the state. Sixty percent of the schools are elementary, a quarter
are middle, and 15 percent are high schools. Across all schools in Arkansas, over two-thirds of
students are white, with African American students making up the largest minority at about 20
percent. On average, 60 percent of students qualify for free or reduced lunch in our sample
years, which is about 15 percentage points higher than the national average.26 Proficiency in
math and literacy in schools averaged almost 70 percent over the nine year study period.
The average rate of students in special education in the state, as shown in Figure 1,
continued to be lower than the national average and showed a general decline of the nine years.

25

The Poverty Index is a sum of 2 times the number of students at a school receiving free lunch and the number of
students receiving reduced priced lunch all divided by total school enrollment.
26
The Digest of Educational Statistics reports about 42 to 48 percent of students as free or reduced price lunch
eligible during this time period. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_046.asp
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The average rate for all schools was at a high in 2004, just above 12 percent, and dropped in
2011 and 2012. By the last year in our data, the state saw a slight rise to about 11 percent.
While lower than the national average of about 13 percent special education enrollment, the
trend in Arkansas parallels the national one.
Figure 4: Percent of students in special education 2003-04 to 2013-14

Figure 2, on the left-hand side, depicts the correlation between the number of students
enrolled in Arkansas schools and their special education enrollment. As other studies have
found, our sample shows a strong relationship between the total enrollment of a school and the
number of students with disabilities enrolled. No doubt that this increases the probability of
larger schools having a large enough special education subgroup to be included in the calculation
of annual yearly progress (AYP). On average, schools in Arkansas enrolled about 48 students in
special education across our years of study. The majority of schools in the state should be
expected to be accountable for the achievement of the subgroup of students with disabilities, but
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a substantial portion are excluded from this requirement. Moreover, with an average special
education enrollment relatively close to the subgroup minimum cutoff, there should be a
substantial number of schools with an incentive to only minimally reduce their population of
students with disability to they are not included in the school’s calculation of AYP.
Figure 2: Descriptive relationships between key variables

Figure 2, on the right hand side, depicts the relationship between the distance a school’s
special education enrollment is from the 40 student cutoff and the percent of students with
disabilities enrolled in the school. There appears to be a slight positive relationship between
these two variables.
Analytic Strategy
The incentive to avoid the inclusion of students with disabilities as a subgroup should
theoretically cause schools to cluster directly below the 40 student cutoff and then quickly drop
off with very few schools enrolling special education populations immediately above the cutoff.
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Figure 3 illustrates the theoretical distribution of enrollment of students with disabilities by
schools on the left, and the true special education enrollment distribution on the right. The graph
of the true distribution illustrates a positively skewed distribution with a large number of schools
at about the 40 student mark but no clear cliff just after the cutoff. Instead, there is a gradual
decline of schools enrolling 40 students to about those enrolling about 150 students with
disabilities.
Figure 3: Comparison between theoretical and true distribution

For analyses, school level fixed-effects models will utilize the variation in rates of
students with disabilities from one year to another to compare the same school as its subgroup
size falls above and below the cutoff.27 Furthermore, the fixed-effects estimator allows each

27

Given the clear cut-point used for the inclusion of a subgroup in AYP, we might consider the use of a regression
discontinuity design (RD). This analysis is unsuited to use an RD because we do not know true treatment status in
our data (whether the state actually included the subgroup). More importantly, a key assumption in an RD is that the
school cannot manipulate the rating variable (Jacob, Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 2012). The goal of this study is to
prove that schools do manipulate the variable of subgroup size, thus violating this assumption.
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school to have a different intercept, which should limit the bias from time-invariant unobservable
school characteristics (Kennedy, 2008).
The use of school-level fixed effects to compare percents of special education enrollment
when the same school falls above and below the minimum count for accountability reporting
requires a significant portion of the schools in the sample to switch from a special education
enrollment above to below the 40 student cutoff and back again over the period analyzed. Table
1 describes the frequency in which schools switched from being above to below the cutoff and
vice versa.28 We see that our models will be able to estimate off of about 40 percent of the
state’s schools.
Table 1: Frequency of schools switching above to below the minimum subgroup size
Total Switches
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

N Schools
809
193
162
74
67
16
14
5

Percent of Sample
60.4%
14.4%
12.1%
5.5%
5.0%
1.2%
1.0%
0.4%

The following basic model is what we utilize for our analysis:
𝐸𝑁𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽2 𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽6 𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡
with the dependent variable of special education enrollment as a percent of total enrollment. The
variable of interest, BELOW, is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a school was below the
minimum subgroup size the prior year (less than 40). Similarly, one year lagged math and
literacy percentages for schools are identified by 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 . The variable, YEAR, allows for a
28

See Appendix Table 1 for differences between schools with one and more than one switch over the study period.
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year time-trend that should account for changing rates of students with disabilities across the
state as descriptive statistics indicate. The variable 𝑋𝑠𝑡 is a matrix of school level time varying
covariates such as percent of students eligible for free or reduced priced lunch, racial make-up,
and limited English proficient. School-level fixed effects are represented by 𝜑𝑠 , eliminating any
bias from time-invariant factors within the school. Finally, idiosyncratic error in the model is
contained within 𝜀𝑠𝑡 .
A subsequent model includes an interaction term between falling below the cutoff and the
distance from the cutoff. Furthermore, to accommodate for the possible non-linear nature of the
distance from the cutoff for special education enrollment, a quadratic distance variable is also
included in the model.
Results
The basic model analyzes the difference in percent of students with disabilities when
schools fall above and below the cutoff of 40 students in special education. Table 2 displays the
results of the school level-fixed effects regressions of falling below the cutoff the prior year on
the percent of students with disabilities at the school. The results in Column 1, without
controlling for any school level factors, illustrate that schools decreased their percent of students
with disabilities by 1.60 percentage points in year following being below the cutoff. When
including prior year proficient/advanced rates for math and literacy (Column 2), the magnitude
of the coefficient on being below the cutoff decreases slightly to -1.53 percentage points. This
relationship increases slightly when accounting for time varying school factors (Column 3),
though again, not by much. The R-squared’s for these models are small, accounting for, at most,
seven percent of the variance. The explanatory power of this model is weak and signals the
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existence of other factors that are impacting the enrollment of students with disabilities in these
schools.
Table 12: Relationship between falling below the minimum subgroup and the percent of students
with disabilities

Below Cutoff

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.0160***
(0.00124)

-0.0153***
(0.00122)
-0.0351***
(0.00683)
0.0135*
(0.00746)

0.129***
(0.00114)

0.137***
(0.00391)

-0.0154***
(0.00121)
-0.0346***
(0.00685)
0.0173**
(0.00755)
0.0830***
(0.0164)
0.0250***
(0.00878)
-0.0173
(0.0200)
0.0131
(0.0244)
0.0231
(0.0201)
0.0296
(0.0211)
0.0828***
(0.0129)

% Math Proficient
% Lit Proficient
% Male
FRL
LEP
Hispanic
Black
Other race
Constant

Observations
7,543
7,543
7,543
R-squared
0.052
0.058
0.072
# of schools
1,052
1,052
1,052
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Schools
were considered below the cutoff if their special education enrollment was 39 students
or less the prior year. Math and literacy proficiency are each the combined percent of
students scoring advanced or proficient on the state Benchmark or End-of Course
examination the prior year. For high school, the percent of students scoring at least
proficient in algebra and geometry were aggregated.

The results from the basic model indicate a negative trend in the percent of students with
disabilities at a school when schools fall below the minimum subgroup cutoff the previous year.
This finding aligns with the hypothesis regarding how we expect schools to behave if they
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internalize the minimum subgroup size and of the low probability of a high proficiency rate for
the group of students with disabilities in the calculation of AYP the prior year. Schools below
the line attempt to stay below the line. It is unlikely that this relationship is completely linear
based on the actual size on the subgroup of students with disabilities.
In addition, there is considerable variation in the number of students from the cutoff a
school falls, and this distance may result in differential incentives. Table 3 displays the results
for the more complex analyses of the heterogeneity in the distance below the cutoff a school
falls. For every one student a school fell below the cutoff the prior year, that same school
increased their special education enrollment by 0.07 percentage points. To determine the
linearity and heterogeneity within this finding, we conducted analyses of distances in increments
of five students from the cutoff. Schools that fell below the cutoff the prior year by only one to
five students saw a decrease in special education enrollment rate by 0.7 percentage points for
every student they fell below the cutoff. The magnitude of this decline is halved to 0.3
percentage points for schools that fell below the cutoff by six to ten students. The null effect of
falling below the cutoff by 11 to 20 students and the increase in percent in special education
when schools fall below the line by over 20 students confirms the hypothesis originally laid out.
Schools that are close to the cutoff but below attempt to stay below the cutoff by reducing their
percent of student in special education.
We consider the behavior of schools when they fall above the cutoff for inclusion of the special
education subgroup in AYP in Columns 4 through 6 of Table 3. We see unexpected
heterogeneous effects for schools that fall above the line. Schools that fall just above the cutoff
(between 1-5 students) have a 0.09 percentage point increase in special education population for
each additional student over the cutoff. This increase becomes a third the size in magnitude for
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schools that are farther from the cutoff with six to ten students in special education. Most
surprisingly, the percent of students in special education declines markedly with each additional
student above the cutoff for schools that are over 56 students in the subgroup. This increase
become over a one and a half percentage point decrease for each additional student for schools
with over 21 students in special education. A possible reason for this may be that schools with
over 71 students with disabilities simply do not have the capacity to keep increasing their special
education program at the same rate as other schools.
Both the basic and more specific models show evidence of a relationship between the
minimum subgroup size and the percent of students with disabilities enrolled in the school. The
results, however, are not causal in nature. For this reason, further research is necessary to make
definitive claims about the potential impact that minimum subgroup requirements have on the
enrollment of students to special education.
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Table 13: Relationship between falling below and distance from the minimum subgroup and the percent of students with disabilities
(1)

Below cutoff
(2)

(3)

(6)

Distance

.0004***
(.0001)

.0004***
(.0001)

.0007***
(.0001)

-.0011***
(.0001)

-.0011***
(.0001)

-.0010***
(.0001)

1-5 students

-.0077***
(.0010)

-.0074***
(.0010)

-.0069**
(.0010)

.0087***
(.0010)

.0085***
(.0010)

.0092***
(.0011)

6-10 students

-.0035***
(.0010)

-.0035***
(.0010)

-.0033***
(.0010)

.0027***
(.0010)

.0026**
(.0010)

.0030***
(.0010)

11-15 students

-.0002
(.0012)

-.0002
(.0012)

.0004
(.0011)

.0003
(.0012)

.0004
(.0012)

.0006
(.0011)

16-20 students

-.0016
(.0013)

-.0016
(.0013)

-.0013
(.0012)

-.0041***
(.0014)

-.0039***
(.0014)

-.0040***
(.0014)

.0122***
(.0012)

.0119***
(.0012)

.0110***
(.0012)

-.0146***
(.0019)

-.0146***
(.0019)

-.0160***
(.0019)

X

X

X

X
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(4)

Above cutoff
(5)

>21 students
Proficiency rates

Demographics
X
X
# of schools
1,052
1,052
1,052
1,052
1,052
1,052
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Schools were considered below
the cutoff if their special education enrollment was 39 students or less the prior year. Distance is measured by
the number of students greater or less than the cutoff of 40 enrolled by the school each year. Math and literacy
proficiency are each the combined percent of students scoring advanced or proficient on the state Benchmark
or End-of Course examination in the prior year. For high school, the percent of students scoring at least
proficient in algebra and geometry were aggregated.

Discussion
The results from this study indicate some potential evidence of incentivized behavior
related to the minimum subgroup size needed to include students with disabilities in calculations
of annual yearly progress (AYP) in Arkansas. The overall relationship is actually quite large
with a 1.5 percentage point decrease in the percent of students with disabilities for schools in the
years after they fell below the minimum subgroup cutoff. The variation based on the distance
from the subgroup size of 40 students indicates, as expected, that schools decrease their percent
of students with disabilities when they were within 10 student below the cutoff the prior year,
and increase when they are quite far below the cutoff.
For schools that fall above the cutoff, the picture is less clear. We expect those schools
who were above the cutoff the prior year to decrease the number of students with disabilities to
move below the cutoff the next year. Conversely to this less clear finding, schools falling below
the cutoff may want to maintain their status and avoid potential consequences associated to the
high probability of failure of this subgroup to make their annual measureable goals and thus the
school fail to make AYP. It may be that schools above the cutoff are simply unable to respond to
the incentive in place due to surges in enrollment. This analysis, however, lacks the ability to
make any causal claims about the impact that the minimum subgroup size actually has on the
percentage of students with disabilities enrolled in Arkansas schools.
As No Child Left Behind (NCLB) was, for many states, a large shift in the education
policy enacted in schools, data prior to the enactment of the policy should provide more robust
estimates of the change it caused. Furthermore, states varied in the number of students required
for the special education and other subgroups to be included in the calculation of AYP.
Comparing the different minimum subgroup sizes across states is likely to also increase our
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understanding of what this aspect of the policy had on students with disabilities. The new
accountability system under the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) has shifted many portions
of NCLB to states. In the wake of these changes, some states have already changed their
minimum subgroup size.
Arkansas is one of these states, lowering its minimum subgroup size to 25 students.
Previously, only 51 percent of Arkansas schools were held accountable for the academic
proficiency of students in special education. The decrease to 25 students for the minimum
subgroup added over 300 schools to those accountable, about a 50 percent increase. The lower
the probability that schools can fall below the minimum subgroup cutoff, the lower chance that
any incentive will exist for schools to alter their identification practices to avoid inclusion in
accountability. The lowering of the subgroup size also expresses the expectation that all schools
should help students with disabilities reach proficiency just like their non-disabled peers.
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1: Comparison of schools that switched only once versus multiple switches
above and below the cutof
1 Switch
412.68
44.4%
23.1%
32.5%

>1 Switch
389.49
60.9%
17.1%
22.0%

Difference
23.189
-16.5%
6.0%
10.5%

Northwest
Northeast
Central
Southwest
Southeast

19.1%
18.5%
17.3%
10.4%
7.2%

23.2%
17.3%
19.6%
10.4%
5.8%

-4.1%
1.1%
-2.2%
0.0%
1.4%

0.05 *
0.57
0.27
0.98
0.27

Math Proficient/Advanced
Literacy Proficient/Advanced

62.3%
64.6%

66.3%
66.8%

-4.0%
-2.2%

0.00 ***
0.02 **

Special Ed.
Section 504
GATE
Male
FRL
Black
Hispanic
White
Other
LEP

12.0%
2.2%
9.1%
51.7%
59.9%
24.8%
6.8%
65.6%
2.8%
4.5%

11.7%
2.0%
8.7%
51.7%
61.2%
23.9%
7.4%
66.0%
2.7%
5.0%

0.3%
0.2%
0.4%
0.1%
-1.3%
0.9%
-0.6%
-0.4%
0.1%
-0.6%

0.14
0.06 *
0.30
0.77
0.25
0.62
0.35
0.83
0.71
0.31

Enrollment
Elementary
Middle School
High School
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p-value
0.93
0.00 ***
0.01 ***
0.00 ***
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Chapter 329
Special Education Identification in the Louisiana Scholarship Program
Introduction
Private school choice programs have existed in the United States since the late nineteenth
century, when Vermont (1869) and Maine (1873) established town tuitioning programs to enable
rural students to attend private schools of choice (Hammons, 2002). Programs take any of three
forms: government issued vouchers, tax-credit scholarships, or Education Savings Accounts
(ESAs), which operate like flexible medical or child-care spending accounts. By the close of
2016, by our count there were 50 private school choice programs in 26 states plus the District of
Columbia (EdChoice, 2016). Private school choice programs were theorized by Milton
Friedman (1955) to give parents options in where to educate their students, thereby increasing
competition and improving schools as well as reducing the tie between schooling and housing
markets. While research on private school choice programs has focused on questions of
constitutionality, segregation, and overall student achievement effects, this study aims to
examine the education of students with disabilities in the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP),
a statewide means-tested school voucher program.30
While increased school choice offers students with disabilities the chance to enroll in
unique private schools to meet individual needs (Lake, 2010), once enrolled families relinquish
their legal rights under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). Special
education advocates fear that students with disabilities will not receive necessary supports and
services once enrolled in private schools (Mead, 2007). Voucher and school choice proponents,
however, argue that parents and students can choose the school that will provide the supports
29
30

This paper was co-authored with Patrick J. Wolf.
The program was initially called the Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program.
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they desire rather than relying on legal mandates in the public school system (Greene & Buck,
2010; Lake & Jacobs, 2008).
This research aims to better understand the implications that voucher usage has on
students with disabilities in the context of a means-tested statewide voucher program. In
particular, we examine a subset of students eligible for the LSP who are identified as having
disabilities. Our analysis utilizes randomization from the LSP’s lottery process to determine the
achievement impacts of the program on 185 students with disabilities. Using student-level
standardized test scores and controlling for baseline characteristics, we estimate the effect of
enrollment in a private school using a voucher on test score achievement after three years of the
LSP for the eligible applicants with disabilities. Moreover, we expand on the literature regarding
the special education identification and de-classification practices in school choice programs.
In the following sections, we review the findings on voucher and tax-credit scholarship
performance impacts from experimental designs and provide a description of some of the main
issues related to students with disabilities in choice settings. Next, we describe the LSP lottery
process and outline our data and analytical strategy. We then provide a presentation of our
academic achievement findings. The final section provides analyses of the probability of special
education identification and de-classification. We conclude with a brief discussion of the
implications of this work.
Prior Literature
School Vouchers and Tax-Credit Scholarships
Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of policies focused
on providing funding for students to attend private schools through vouchers or other policy
mechanisms. There are currently 50 voucher, tax-credit scholarship, and Education Savings
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Account (ESA) programs in 26 states and the District of Columbia. Eighteen of these programs
are specifically aimed at students with disabilities (EdChoice, 2016). Researchers have used
randomized control trials (RCT’s) to evaluate several private school choice programs over the
last 20 years. Through the use of the natural experiment caused by oversubscription to these
programs and subsequent random lotteries, these evaluations eliminated selection bias concerns
that otherwise can bedevil school choice research.
The first RCT of a voucher program was conducted by Greene, Peterson, & Du (1998) of
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. The study reported that student test scores were higher
in math and reading after three or more years of exposure to the program. Rouse (1998)
conducted a replication of the initial Milwaukee RCT, using different estimation strategies and
concluding that the program only produced positive impacts in math.
Privately funded partial-tuition scholarships in Dayton, Ohio, Washington, D.C, and New
York City were evaluated using an RCT design by Howell et al. (2002). In all three cities,
students offered a voucher experienced positive overall achievement effects but only for African
American students. The positive effects of the program disappeared in the third year of the
evaluation in Washington, D.C. Subsequent replication studies of the New York wing of the
three-city study reported a mix of positive achievement effects for African Americans (Barnard
et al. 2003; Jin, Barnard & Rubin, 2010) and no statistically significant impacts for any
subgroups of students (Krueger & Zhu 2004; Bitler et al. 2015).
Greene (2001) conducted an RCT of a privately funded scholarship program in Charlotte,
reporting positive achievement effects after just one year. Cowen (2008) conducted a replication
study of the Charlotte program and confirmed moderately large and statistically significant
positive effects in reading after only one year of the program.
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Wolf et al. (2013) conducted an experimental evaluation of the D.C. Opportunity
Scholarship Program, the first federally funded voucher program. After five years of program
implementation, evaluators found positive overall effects on reading and math that were only
marginally statistically significant, at the level of p<10, but clearer positive effects for the
subgroups of females, students with relatively higher baseline test scores, and students who had
not attended a school in need of improvement before joining the program. Mills and Wolf
(2016) recently released a test-score analysis of the Louisiana Scholarship Program, reporting
large negative impacts in math after one year that decreased somewhat but remained statistically
significant after two years.
None of the evaluations of voucher programs in the United States have included the
academic achievement of students with disabilities as a subgroup in their analyses, although
students in special education participate in the programs and the evaluations. Many of these
programs have enrollment caps that make the special education subgroup so small that
researchers have little ability to study them as a distinct group. For this reason, most of the
literature on private school choice and students with disabilities focuses on parental satisfaction
and differences in identification of students as disabled in choice settings.
The most recent non-experimental evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
found statistically significant positive growth in reading scores for all students participating in
the program but math effects that were not statistically significant (Witte et al., 2014). Further
analysis of enrollment rates for students with disabilities participating in the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program showed considerable differences in the identification of students as having
disabilities as they moved in and out of the private school sector but similar levels of school
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satisfaction regardless of whether students with disabilities were in public or private schools
(Wolf, Witte, & Fleming, 2012).
While currently there are 18 voucher, tax-credit scholarships, and ESA programs in the
United States targeted specifically to students with disabilities, Florida’s John M. McKay
Scholarship for Students with Disabilities Program is the only one that has been evaluated
empirically. Greene and Forster (2003) surveyed families of students who were current or
former participants. They found that parents of McKay participants had significantly higher
satisfaction with their private school than with their prior public schools. Greene and Forster
also found that parents reported smaller class sizes, fewer incidents of bullying, and decreased
behavioral problems for their students. Future research needs to be conducted to determine
whether these same results occur when students with disabilities take part in voucher programs
that are not restricted to students with special needs.
Legal Issues of Students with Disabilities in Private Schools
The focus on supporting the unique needs of students with disabilities in schools has continued
to grow since the passage of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Department of
Education, 2013), which prohibits the discrimination of individuals on the basis of disability.
The legal protections for students with disabilities increased with the passage of the Education of
All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) of 1975, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of
1990, and finally the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1997 which was
renewed in 2004. These federal laws entitled students with disabilities to access to a free and
appropriate education (FAPE). With the newest legislation, IDEA also stipulates that students
with disabilities be educated in the least restrictive environment, so that they may be educated to
the extent possible with their non-disabled peers and still receive FAPE. The specifications for
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each student’s learning environment is detailed in their Individual Education Program (IEP),
which is updated yearly by an IEP team, composed of the student’s family and school staff (Wolf
& Hassel, 2001). As of the 2011-12 school year, of the over 6.4 million students with an IEP,
comprising 12.9% of the student population ages 3-21, 61% were educated in the general
education classroom at least 80% of the time (U.S. Department of Education, 2016).
Legislation pertaining to students with disabilities has had important implications for
special education in the United States, but also has created challenges for students with
disabilities who participate in private school voucher programs. When a parent chooses to enroll
a student with a disability in a school voucher program, they relinquish their legal rights under
Section 504, which only applies to organizations accepting federal funds (Taylor, 2009). Title
III of the 1990 ADA Act states that private schools must meet nondiscrimination requirements
that prohibit exclusion, segregation, and unequal treatment (Department of Justice, 2009). This
legislation would provide reasonable guarantees of rights to students with disabilities
participating in a voucher program; however, ADA does not apply to religious organizations
(Taylor, 2009) and most private schools participating in voucher programs are religious.
The reauthorization of IDEA in 2004 brought new implications for students with
disabilities who attend private schools through parental choice. § 300.131 clearly states that
local education agencies (LEA’s) must “identify, locate, and evaluate” students with disabilities
in private schools, including religious schools, as part of their child find process (IDEA, 2004).
The LEA must meet with private school representatives to determine the number of students with
disabilities enrolled in order to provide equitable services to those the students would receive in
the public schools (IDEA, 2004). While this requirement does not guarantee an individual’s
right to services or an entitlement to funds, it does provide private schools with resources to
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support students with disabilities. A study conducted for the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops (USCCB, 2002) looked specifically at how this legislation was being
implemented in 2,800 Catholic schools in twenty-one states serving over a million students.
Less than one percent of students identified as having a disability enrolled in Catholic schools
were receiving services for their disabilities through IDEA funds. In this study as well as Wolf,
Witte, and Fleming’s (2012) study of the Milwaukee Parental Choice program, private school
administrators reported great challenges in obtaining the supports needed from the LEA.
Identification and Enrollment
Much of the choice literature regarding students with disabilities is concentrated on concerns that
choice schools discriminate against these students in the enrollment process, resulting in a low
proportion of students with disabilities taking part in school choice. The USCCB’s 2002 survey
found that 7 percent of students enrolled in Catholic schools were identified as having a
disability. Wolf, Witte, and Fleming (2012) had similar findings that at least 7.5 percent and
possibly as many as 14.6 percent of students participating in the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program had a disability. This research team also found no statistical disadvantage during
school admittance to students based on disability (Wolf, 2013).
Nearly every voucher program requires participating schools to comply with some sort of
nondiscrimination requirement. For example, Virginia’s Education Improvement Scholarships
Tax Credit program only requires that schools comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (EdChoice, 2016). That law only prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and national
origin (Department of Justice, 2013). Private schools in Louisiana are only required to comply
with Brumfield v. Dodd, a federal nondiscrimination court order for the purpose of racial
desegregation (Louisiana Department of Education, 2014).
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Most of the literature on school choice and special education revolves around concerns
over enrollment discrimination in the charter sector (Heubert, 1997; Horn & Miron, 2000; Rhim,
2008; Garda, 2012). In recent years, however, several studies have systematically analyzed the
movement of students with disabilities in and out of the charter sector as well as in and out of
special education eligibility status (Setren, 2015; Winters, 2013; 2014; 2015). These studies, as
with Wolf, Witte, and Fleming’s (2012) analysis of vouchers in Milwaukee, suggest that
discrepancies in the enrollment rate of students with disabilities across school sectors are an issue
of parental choice, student mobility, and differential declassification practices rather than
necessarily one of discrimination.
Special Education and School Choice
The premise behind special education is the individualization of student learning experiences in
order to enable students to meet their goals. This is very similar to the goal of school choice,
which offers students and parents various options for schooling based on their specific needs.
These two ideals meet when school choice programs enable students with disabilities and their
families to choose the particular school that they think will meet their educational needs (Lake,
2010). In particular, many school choice models provide students with disabilities of varying
severity an opportunity to be fully included in the general education population at their schools
(Setren, 2015) due to a lack of economy of scale for self-contained programs. Small private and
public charter schools simply cannot afford to exclude their students with special needs from the
rest of their school population.
Inclusion of students with disabilities into general education classrooms potentially
provides them with the least restrictive environment possible. Public schools have been legally
required to place students with disabilities in the least restrictive environment since the EAHCA
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of 1975. While we assume that integrating students with disabilities into general education
classrooms is beneficial, the research studying the effects of inclusion on academic achievement
is limited (Cosier, Causton-Theoharis, & Theoharis, 2013; Mills, Cole, Jenkins, & Dale, 1998;
Rea, McLaughlin, & Walther-Thomas, 2002; Waldron & McLeskey, 1998). Systematic reviews,
with higher external validity than small scale studies, indicate that inclusive practices are at least
as effective as less inclusive settings in improving academic achievement, particularly for
younger students with disabilities (Freeman & Alkin, 2000; Kalambouka et al., 2005; Lindsey,
2007; Salend & Duhaney, 2009).
While school choice may result in high parental satisfaction on the part of participating
parents (Greene & Forster, 2003), very little is known about the effect of choice programs on
academic achievement for students with disabilities. Angrist et al (2013) and Setren (2015)
analyze the longer-term outcomes for students with disabilities in Boston charter schools. Both
studies find large positive and statistically significant effects of winning a charter lottery on the
academic achievement of students with disabilities. While they find negative effects of charters
for on-time graduation of students with disabilities, the effects are null if the outcome is five-year
graduation rates (Angrist et al, 2013; Setren, 2015). Voucher programs, especially, have not
always required standardized testing of participating students, so an accurate relationship
between achievement and participation in the program is difficult to calculate. As Ohio’s Jon
Peterson Special Needs Scholarship Program is the only voucher program for students with
disabilities that requires this population to participate in testing, and the sample sizes of students
with disabilities participating in many other voucher and tax credit scholarship programs are
quite small, the comparative achievement for students with disabilities enrolled in a voucher
program to those who remain in the public schools remains unknown.
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This research aims to fill the gap in the literature on students with disabilities who are
offered a voucher to attend a private school. We analyze the characteristics of students with
disabilities who applied to the LSP as well as those who specifically won the lottery to enroll in a
participating voucher school. Furthermore, we provide estimates of the effect of the LSP on math
and English language arts achievement for students with disabilities who were awarded
scholarships. A final analysis focuses on special education identification differences between
students who received vouchers and those who did not. In the following section, we describe the
data and analytical strategy used to estimate these effects.
Program Background
In 2008, the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP)—formerly known as the Student Scholarships
for Educational Excellence Program—was piloted in New Orleans through Act 509. The
program provides students with a voucher to attend private school at no cost. To be eligible, a
student must live in a household with income at or below 250 percent of the federal poverty line
and attend a school district that was deemed to be academically in crisis, a school that became
part of the Recovery School District (RSD), and a city with a total population of at least 300,000
people (Tyler, 2011). New Orleans was the only city in Louisiana that met those criteria. In its
first year, just over 1,000 students were awarded scholarships to attend private schools, and this
number grew to over 2,000 in the 2011-12 school year.
Louisiana passed Act 2 in 2012 to expand the LSP to the entire state of Louisiana. The
statewide scholarship program continued to use household income to determine eligibility, but it
altered the criteria to include students who had attended a Louisiana public school that had
received a grade of “C”, “D”, or “F” in the state’s accountability system (Act No. 2 of 2012).
For the 2012-13 school year, approximately 10,400 students submitted applications and 5,600
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students were awarded scholarships based on a random “Roth” placement lottery to attend one of
the 130 participating schools.31 The voucher amount per student was equal to the lesser of the
revenue the local public school would have received from the state or the total cost of private
school tuition and fees. The average tuition for private schools participating in the LSP ranged
from $2,966 to $8,999, with a median of $4,925. This amount can be compared to Louisiana’s
per pupil funding from the state’s minimum foundation formula of $8,500 (LDE, 2013f).
Parents of students with disabilities who received special education services previously at
their public school and enrolled in a participating private school were required to sign a
document upon enrollment stating their acceptance only of the services that the private school
made available to all students. If, however, the parent enrolled the student in a participating
private school that had delivered services for students with disabilities for at least two years by
teachers with special education certification and in accordance with the students’ IEP, the state
would supplement the voucher with the cost of providing special education services (Act No. 2
of 2012). Through searches of all the participating schools’ websites, 48 of the 130 private
schools participating in the program specified school based resources for struggling learners or
students with disabilities. The services ranged from mental health counseling to the provision of
special day classes for students with severe needs. Further research is needed to determine if
these programs were developed in response to the LSP or if they were present beforehand.
Alongside the LSP, in 2010, Louisiana started the School Choice Pilot Program for
Certain Students with Exceptionalities. Students are only eligible for this program if they have
an IEP due to the disabilities of developmental delay, other health impairment, specific learning
disability, autism, mental disability, emotional disturbance, or traumatic brain injury and are
A “Roth” lottery is a placement lottery governed by a special algorithm, pioneered by Nobel Laureate Alvin E.
Roth, which generates incentives to express one’s true rank-order preferences of schools in the context of school
choice (e.g. Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth 2005).
31
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currently enrolled in a Louisiana public school (LDE, 2013a). Students with the types of
disabilities that render them eligible for this voucher program are rare, thankfully. Furthermore,
private schools are only able to participate in the program if they are located in a parish with a
population over 190,000.32 For the 2013-14 school year, 17 schools participated in the program.
Finally, the special education voucher only covers 50 percent of the state’s minimum foundation
amount or the school’s tuition, whichever is less. This amounts to about $2,200 across the state
on average (LDE, 2013a). Participation in the program is also determined by a separate random
lottery. While not specified by the state of Louisiana, it is assumed that a student cannot
participate in both the special education and means-tested voucher programs.
Research Methodology
Experimental Design
With the expansion of the LSP in 2012 to a statewide program, the Louisiana Department of
Education introduced a deferred acceptance lottery, similar to the process utilized in New York
City’s public school choice program (see Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005). This lottery
allowed parents to choose up to five private schools, ranking their school preferences. The
lottery algorithm placed students into grade level available seats within the schools in their
preference list. Students were also given priorities in the lottery based on certain characteristics.
In the first year of the program, the Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) gave
students with disabilities and “multiple birth siblings”33 an automatic placement into voucher
receiving schools. If all applicants who were in special education actually received a spot in a
private school, our analytical approach would not have been possible. In reality, students with
disabilities were not all awarded a voucher to attend a private school. The lottery mechanism
32

Seven total parishes meet this eligibility requirement; Caddo, Calcasieu, East Baton Rouge, Jefferson, Lafayette,
Orleans, and St. Tammany.
33
“Multiple birth siblings” are twins, triplets, etc.
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assigned students to available grade openings at participating schools based on preference
categories. It is currently unclear where the preference for students with disabilities fell in the
process (NOLA pilot program participants and their siblings also were high priority students).
One of two things likely occurred: (1) students with disabilities who had the same preferences
and applied to the same grade and school were not all placed if there were fewer seats available
then students with disabilities vying for them; or, (2) the lottery process did not actually take into
account student disability.34 Fewer than 50 percent of our analytic sample of students with
disabilities were offered placement in a private school through the voucher program (Table 1).
We treat students with disabilities as their own group within the lottery process in order
to maintain what, we believe, was the intention of the lottery. After omitting students with
multiple birth siblings and those who attended a school with an accountability rating of “B,”35 we
grouped students in the following priority categories:


Priority 1 - Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who
are applying to the same school



Priority 2 - Siblings of Priority 1 awardees in the current round



Priority 3 - Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who
are applying to a different school



Priority 4 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “D” or
“F” grade in Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline

At baseline, we identify students as having a disability through application (parents identified a student’s
disability category) and testing data (students are labeled as “special” or “regular,” they took one of the two
alternative assessments, and if they took an alternative assessment, they are given a disability category). We have
little evidence regarding the actual usage of these data in determining the lottery preferences. When creating lottery
preferences with and without student special education status included, the probability of winning is not clearly
altered along any disability indicator.
35
These students were not eligible for the program.
34
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Priority 5 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “C” grade
in Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline



Priority 6 – New applicants who are applying for kindergarten placements

The lottery process first attempts to place students in the first priority category into their
first choice school based on available seats in the student’s grade level. If there are enough
available seats in the school and grade for all applicants in Priority 1, all students are offered a
scholarship. When no seats in a school and grade level are available in which students apply, no
students are offered a scholarship. Once all students in Priority 1 are placed in a school and grade
level, students in Priority 2 with the same school and grade level first choice school preference
are offered a scholarship. After going through each priority category for first choice school
preferences, the lottery algorithm continues the process by utilizing students’ second choice
schools. This process repeats itself until all students been awarded or not awarded a scholarship.
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Figure 5: Louisiana Scholarship Program lottery process

Mills and Wolf (2016)

Not all students actually take part in a lottery, however. Only in cases where there are
more students in the same priority category than seats in a school and grade available is an actual
lottery conducted. Thus, we identify students as having participated in a lottery if the percentage
of students awarded a scholarship in their given risk set36 is between zero and 100. For our RCT
analyses, we focus just on this sample of students since they are the only students with
disabilities who we can determine were randomly awarded a scholarship to attend a private
school as part of the LSP. Due to the small sample size and overall low external validity from
only including students who were awarded scholarships to over-subscribed schools, we also
include analyses that broaden the sample of students with disabilities to all eligible applicants
including those who may not have participated in a lottery.
36

Risk sets are constructed from students in the same priority category, school preference, grade, and special
education designation.
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Data Description
The data for this study come from three sources. Student-level information on LSP eligibility and
scholarship usage as well as student performance outcomes were provided by the Louisiana
Department of Education (LDE) in accordance with our data agreement with the state. The LDE
additionally provided information on participating public and private schools, and this
information was supplemented with publicly available data from the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES), Common Core of Data (CCD) and Private School Universe Survey
(PSS), when necessary.
The primary data for our analysis are drawn from student applications in the year 2011-12
(“Baseline”) and the state assessment results for the 2011-12 (“Baseline’), 2012-13 (“Year 1”),
2013-14 (“Year 2”), and 2014-15 (“Year 3”) school years. In our analysis of identification and
de-identification, we choose to only refer to a student as in special education if indicated in
testing data. Application data was only available at Baseline, making this an inconsistent data
source. The Louisiana state assessment system use IEP status to distinguish students with
disabilities among LEAP/iLEAP test takers. We also identify students as in special education in
the testing data if they took a modified or alternative assessment in any year.
In addition to individual performance outcomes, the state-provided assessment data files
include information on student demographics as well as participation in school programs such as
free- or reduced-price lunch (FRL), limited English proficient (LEP), and special education. Our
analysis includes these baseline covariates in order to improve effect estimate precision.
Fortunately, none of the LSP eligible students with disabilities who met our testing data
requirements had missing data on baseline covariate values.
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Sample Selection Process
The student-level data provided by the LDE indicate an initial sample of 9,829 eligible LSP
applicants in the first year of the statewide expansion of the program. Of these, 5,771 students
received LSP scholarship placements in a specific private school and 4,058 did not receive a
voucher-supported placement. We then exclude 1,965 students with multiple birth siblings and
those who attended schools with a grade of “B” at the time of application along with students
who were awarded scholarships for the New Orleans Pilot Program. Of the remaining 2,401
students who have baseline test scores and are in grades 3-6, only 254 have disabilities37 and
therefore remain in our sample. Of the sample of 254 students with disabilities, 113 faced a
lottery for scholarship award and placement (Table 1).
Table 14: Sample selection process for participant effects analysis
Total Records

Received
Scholarship

Eligible LSP applicants

9,809

5,771

― not participating in former New Orleans pilot

8,070

4,072

― identified as in Special Education at baseline

977

412

― in experimental analysis sample

185

96

Source. Authors’ calculations.
Students with Disabilities and Non-Disabled Peers at Baseline
First, we compare our applicants in special education to the overall eligible applicants for the
LSP. We also include statistics on the state of Louisiana’s students in special education in order
to compare our sample to the larger population. For the sample of students without disabilities,
the final placement conducted by the Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) resulted in an
even distribution of students into the treatment and comparison groups on the basis of gender.
37

We only identify students at baseline using testing data in order to maintain uniformity across years in which
application data cannot be updated.
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The special education subgroup, like the overall Louisiana special education population, has a
disproportionate rate of male students compared to females. This finding is not especially
concerning as we know that males are often disproportionately placed in special education.
Similarly, there is a seven percentage point difference between the overall sample and the special
education subgroup in regards to free or reduced lunch participation.
Table 15: Special education eligible applicants compared to other applicants and Louisiana’s
special education population at baseline

Total

Other Eligible
Applicants
N
%

Special Education
Eligible
Applicants
N
%

8,784

1,379

LA NonApplicant Special
Education
N
%
43,060

Gender
Female

4,325

49.2%

545

39.5%

13,879 32.2%

Male

4,459

50.8%

834

60.5%

29,181 67.8%

Black

7,629

86.9%

1,252

90.8%

22,472 52.1%

Hispanic

228

2.6%

29

2.1%

White

680

7.7%

19

1.4%

Other

247

2.8%

26

1.9%

Yes

5,315

63.2%

947

70.8%

33,923 78.7%

No

3,100

36.8%

391

29.2%

8,924 20.7%

Ethnicity

1,034

2.4%

18,613 43.2%
1,012

2.3%

FRL

Notes. Sample represents all students with baseline testing data.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
Predictably, students with disabilities in our sample are also far more likely than their
non-disabled peers to score “approaching basic” and “unsatisfactory,” the lowest proficiency
levels, on their baseline achievement tests (See Table 3). Students with disabilities and their nondisabled peers score in the “advanced” or “mastery” range with equal infrequency. The best a
115

student who takes the modified assessment can score is the “basic” proficiency level; but, we do
not see that this increases the likelihood that a student with a disability will reach the “basic”
level compared to their non-disabled peers. The vast majority of modified test takers score in the
“foundational” and “pre-foundational” levels, which are categorized under “unsatisfactory.”
Table 16: Test scores levels for special education eligible applicants compared to other at
baseline
Other

Special Education
N
%

N
%
Proficiency - ELA
Advanced
41
1.3%
3
0.4%
Mastery
305
9.8%
42
5.3%
Basic
1,398
44.8%
229
28.8%
Approaching Basic
931
29.8%
253
31.8%
Unsatisfactory
446
14.3%
268
33.7%
Proficiency - Math
Advanced
41
1.3%
2
0.3%
Mastery
305
9.8%
42
5.3%
Basic
1,398
44.8%
229
28.8%
Approaching Basic
931
29.8%
253
31.9%
Unsatisfactory
446
14.3%
268
33.8%
Note: The LAA2, modified assessment level of unsatisfactory is split into two categories:
Foundational and pre-Foundational (lowest).
Disaggregating Students with Disabilities
Looking further at the distribution of disabilities in our sample included in our analysis we
analyze the difference in the disabilities of students offered a private school placement and those
who were not (Table 4). Overall, the two groups are very similar. The largest differences are a
three percentage point lower rate of awardees with intellectual disabilities and three percentage
points higher rate of awardees with a speech or language impairment. Moreover, in comparison
to the state of Louisiana, the disabilities of students offered placement in a private school and
those who were not are nearly identical. In 2012, Louisiana enrolled a higher proportion of
students with specific learning disabilities and a lower proportion with speech or language
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impairments. While students with speech and language impairments often receive fewer services
and considered one of the least severe disabilities, this can similarly be said for specific learning
disabilities.
Table 17: Description of the special education sample in relation to Louisiana
Awarded
Not Awarded
LA State Special
Scholarship†
Scholarship †
Education ††
N
%
N
%
N
%
Total
319
367
70,029
Autism
11
3.4%
13
3.5%
3,683
5.3%
Deaf - Blindness
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
5
0.0%
Developmental Delay (3-9)
36 11.3%
40 10.9%
5,857
8.4%
Emotional Disturbance
14
4.4%
14
3.8%
1,756
2.5%
Hearing Impairment
7
2.2%
4
1.1%
1,148
1.6%
Intellectual Disability
18
5.6%
33
9.0%
7,185 10.3%
Multiple Disabilities
5
1.6%
9
2.5%
944
1.3%
Orthopedic Impairment
4
1.3%
3
0.8%
1,066
1.5%
Other Health Impairment
25
7.8%
30
8.2%
9,553 13.6%
Specific Learning Disability
94 29.5%
107 29.2%
23,196 33.1%
Speech/Lang. Impairment
102 32.0%
106 28.9%
14,931 21.3%
Traumatic Brain Injury
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
228
0.3%
Visual Impairment
3
0.9%
8
2.2%
477
0.7%
Notes. Special education sample includes all students with disabilities with baseline test scores
while enrolled in grade three through six and did not have multiple births. Louisiana does not
differentiate between mild and moderate mental disabilities.
Sources. †Authors’ calculations †† DATA.gov (2012)
Schools of choice often declassify students as special education (Wolf, Witte, & Fleming,
2012; Setren, 2015; Winters, 2013; 2014; 2015; Winters, Carpenter II, & Clayton, 2017). To see
whether this pattern is true in the LSP, we looked at the difference between students offered
private school placement and those not offered a placement who changed classification from the
baseline to the third year of the program (Table 5). Simply observing the percent differences
between students awarded and not awarded a scholarship does not indicate large differences
between the two groups. This trend will be analyzed more rigorously later in this report. Table 6
looks at the year-by-year trends. While there still lacks a clear pattern of identification or de117

identification, it is at least interesting to observe the large numbers of students who change their
disability status multiple time.
Table 18: Changes in special education identification from baseline to Year 3
Award Scholarship
N
%
Classification Switchers
Did not switch
Special Ed to General Ed
General Ed to Special Ed

541
94
36

80.6%
14.0%
5.4%

Not Awarded
Scholarship
N
%
867
100
47

85.5%
9.9%
4.6%

Table 19: Changes in special education identification from baseline through Year 3
Award
Scholarship
N
%
Classification Switchers
not-not-not-not
not-not-not-sped
not-not-sped-not
not-not-sped-sped
not-sped-not-not
not-sped-not-sped
not-sped-sped-not
not-sped-sped-sped
sped-not-not-not
sped-not-not-sped
sped-not-sped-not
sped-not-sped-sped
sped-sped-not-not
sped-sped-not-sped
sped-sped-sped-not
sped-sped-sped-sped

423
15
11
13
72
4
0
4
63
2
6
5
19
5
6
23

63.0%
2.2%
1.6%
1.9%
10.7%
0.6%
0.0%
0.6%
9.4%
0.3%
0.9%
0.7%
2.8%
0.7%
0.9%
3.4%

Not Awarded
Scholarship
N
%
653
20
56
8
73
7
13
12
50
2
6
12
25
6
19
52

64.4%
2.0%
5.5%
0.8%
7.2%
0.7%
1.3%
1.2%
4.9%
0.2%
0.6%
1.2%
2.5%
0.6%
1.9%
5.1%

Analytical Strategy
In order to better identify differential probabilities of identification and de-identification in
special education over time, we estimate annual probabilities. We begin with our two models to
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estimate the probability of identification or de-identification, 𝑦1 , and probability of attending a
lottery, 𝑦2 .
𝑦1 = 1[𝒛1 𝜹1 + 𝛼1 𝑦2 + 𝑢1 >0]

(4)

𝑦2 = 1[𝒛2 𝜹2 + 𝑣2 >0]

(5)

Our error terms, (𝑢2 , 𝑣2 ), are uncorrelated with z, but correlated with one another. If we
estimated these models separately, our estimates would be inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2010).
Instead, we estimate our models using a bivariate probit to model the probability of enrolling in
the LSP simultaneously with the probability of identification or de-identification. Based on
Wooldridge (2010) and Cameron and Trivedi (2009) we estimate our model as:
𝑃(𝑦1 = 1|𝑦2 = 1, 𝒛) = 𝐸[𝑃(𝑦1 = 1|𝑣2 , 𝒛)|𝑦2 = 1, 𝒛]

(6)

We estimate our bivariate probit models disaggregated to observe annual patterns of
identification and de-identification. Additionally, we analyze the probability of being identified
or de-identified by the end of three years in the program for all students, those initially not
identified, and those who were identified at baseline as having special education services.
Wolf, Witte, and Fleming (2012) conducted student fixed effects to estimate the
probability of a student being identified or de-identified in the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program (MPCP). This estimation strategy relies on students who change schooling sectors at
least once during the analysis time. Modeling non-linear panel data in this way will not produce
consistent estimates if Ti is small, which will result in bias estimates of unobservable student
characteristics also biases are estimates of β (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). With only four years of
data, we determined that this is not the most reliable method of estimating causal effects of the
LSP on student identification and de-identification.
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Results
We present our bivariate probit marginal effects of the probability of being identified for special
education services or having that label removed by the third year of the program are displayed in
Table 7. Our results are consistent with prior literature on identification and de-identification in
special education. Estimates for the effect of de-identification for students in special education
who enroll in the LSP are about 60 percentage points higher than the control group from a base
rate of de-identification of about 25 percent. These results are not statistically significant in our
fully specified and preferred model. Over eighteen percent of students are newly identified for
special education over the three years. For students enrolled in the program, they were seven
percentage points less likely to be newly identified for special education then students in the
control group. In total, students who enrolled in the LSP were just over 14 percentage points less
likely to be in special education by the third year in the program.
Table 7: Bivariate probit marginal effects for the likelihood of identification and de-identification
for special education, lotteried sample
Simple

Fully Specified

Special education
de-identification

0.592***
(0.000)

0.610
(0.316)

General education
identification

-0.091***
(0.000)

-0.070**
(0.045)

-0.143**
-0.118
Overall probability of special
education
(0.014)
(0.519)
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures are standardized within test type and grade
based on the score distributions of members of the control group. All models
control for modified assessment. Standard errors could not be calculated for
marginal effects, but were calculated in initial bivariate probit models to
account for nesting of observations at in lottery risk sets. Excluded
comparison group is African American students
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In addition to our overall analyses, we present our disaggregated annual effects of
enrolling in an LSP private school on identification and de-identification in each year of the
program (Table 8). We only see that there are differential probabilities between treatment and
control for the identification for special education in the third year. Students who enrolled in
their first choice LSP private school were 4.5 percentage points less likely to be identified for
special education in the third year of the program when the average rate of identification was 4.6
percent. In the second year of the program we see nearly a 50 percentage point higher likelihood
of having one’s special education label removed for students enrolled in their first choice private
school when the average likelihood of de-identification was 55 percent. These effects reverse
direction in the third year of the program, most likely because there are so few students left who
need to be de-identified in the private schools following the first and second years. These trends
likely demonstrate the differential equilibrium in special education identification between the
private and public schools.
Figure 6 depicts the trends in identification and de-identification over the three years of
the program. This representation shows the large swing in de-identification effects for students
who participated in the LSP in Year 3 of the program. Given the de-identification in the first two
years of the program, it is unsurprising that there is a drop in the third year when there are few
students left who may be on the margin of benefiting from their special education label.

121

Table 8: Bivariate probit marginal effects for the likelihood of identification and de-identification
for special education, lotteried sample
Year 1
(1)
(2)
Identification
Observations
De-Identification

Year 2

Year 3

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.024

-0.098***

-0.083

-0.053***

-0.045**

1,040
1,040
0.283*** 0.218

989
0.498***

989
0.489***

1,060
-0.343*

1,060
-0.324**

0.019

Observations
212
212
240
240
198
198
Demographics
X
X
X
Total Choices
X
X
X
NOLA
X
X
X
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures are standardized within test type and grade based on the
score distributions of members of the control group. All models control for modified
assessment. Standard errors could not be calculated for marginal effects, but were
calculated in initial bivariate probit models to account for nesting of observations at in
lottery risk sets. Excluded comparison group is African American students.
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Figure 2: Trends in identification and de-identification for special education in the LSP
0.6

0.489

**

0.5
0.4
0.3

0.218

0.2
0.1

0.024
-0.083

0

-0.045

**

-0.324

**

-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
Year 1

Year 2
Identification

Year 3
De-Identification

Notes. Estimates presented are for the most specified models, which
include baseline achievement, demographics, number of schools
preferred on application, and whether the student attending school in
New Orleans.
Discussion
This paper offers an analysis of the first three years of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP)
for students with disability. While our results are largely inconclusive, we believe there are a
number of ways in which this work will benefit the existing literature on the experiences of
students with disabilities in school choice programs. First, we establish that 13% of the eligible
applicants to the LSP in its first year were students with disabilities. This rate of application is
identical to the overall state of Louisiana’s special education enrollment. While other school
choice programs have low special education enrollment, the LSP demonstrates a desire of
parents of students with disabilities to have access to private school choice.
Second, this research represents the first attempt to estimate the causal relationship
between enrolling in a private school through a publicly funded voucher and special education
identification. As prior literature found that schools of choice are more likely to remove the
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special education label when students with disabilities enroll, we find similar results, though
these are not robust to our preferred specifications. We clearly see that students who participate
in the LSP are less likely than the control group to be identified for special education. While not
robust to our preferred specification, it does appear that students in the program are overall less
likely to be in special education by the third year. Our individual year discrete duration models,
show evidence that in Year 3 of the program, students who won scholarships were less likely to
be identified for special education; and in Year 2, they were more likely to have a special
education label removed.
As a society, it is unclear whether identifying students for special education is positive or
negative. If students who truly have disabilities and need services are identified, then we assume
it is positive. The assumption is often that schools over-identify students as needing special
education services in order to acquire additional funding, exempt students from accountability, or
remove them from the general education classrooms. Thus, reducing identification is typically
considered a positive policy change. As we do not know the true disability incidence rate in the
population, we cannot determine what a desirable outcome actually is in this case.
These findings have limitations. First, the results are based on a small sample of students
identified and de-identified who won a lottery to attend their first choice LSP private school.
This small sample, along with our analytical requirements, restricts the statistical power of our
analysis. Furthermore, we identify students with disabilities using the state testing data. Nontested students with disabilities cannot be included in our study. For this reason, we also caution
against generalizing these findings to all the students with disabilities participating in the LSP
and other private school voucher programs.
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Appendix
The analysis in this appendix serves as a robustness check of our overall discrete duration model
findings using Cox proportional hazard models in place of probit estimations.
Analytic strategy
In order to estimate the average effect of scholarship award to a student’s first choice school on
the likelihood of identification to special education and likelihood of having a disability
identification removed, we use a Cox proportional hazard model. We estimate using a hazard
function defined as:
ℎ(𝑡|𝒙𝑗 ) = ℎ0 (𝑡)exp(𝒙𝑗 𝜷𝑥 )

(1)

and derive the likelihood function:
𝐿(𝛽) = ∏𝑛𝑗=1 {∑

exp(𝒙𝑗 𝜷)

𝑖∈𝑅𝑗 exp(𝒙𝑗 𝜷)

}

(2)

Because the variable of enrollment in the LSP is endogenous, we still want to leverage
our lottery process to identify causal effects in our survival analysis. The survival analysis
routines offered do not provide for a two stage process in which the first stage predicts the
probability of enrollment in an LSP private school based on receiving a scholarship to the
student’s first choice school. We manually compute the first stage (6) using a probit model38 and
use the predicted probability of enrollment in an LSP school as our variable of interest in our
Cox hazard models.39
𝐸𝑖 = 𝛿𝐴𝑖 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡

(3)

Results
We utilize both the Cox proportional hazard models and discrete duration models to estimate the
probability of special education identification and de-identification over the three years of the
LSP. Our special education identifier comes from the annual testing data that indicates whether
a student is in special education or general education.40

38

E is the indicator for whether student i was awarded a scholarship. A is our variable identifying whether a student
was awarded a scholarship for the LSP to attend their first choice school. X is a vector of individual baseline
covariates, including student achievement in ELA and math, used to improve model precision.
39
The stcox routine in Stata is used for these estimations.
40
In Year 3, disability category included gifted and talented, which we exclude from the categorization of special
education.
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We present the results of our analysis over the three years of the LSP in Table 15.
Hazard ratios are presented and should be interpreted as a one percent higher probability of
disability identification for students who enrolled in their LSP first choice school for every 0.01
above one. For example, in our most specified model (Column 4), our estimate on LSP
enrollment is 1.373 for identification, which equates to a 37.3 percent higher probability of
special education identification for students who enrolled in their first choice LSP private school
compared to the control group, though the difference is not statistically significant. Over
eighteen percent of students are newly identified for special education, and about 25 percent of
students lost their special education identifications over the three years the program was in place.
Interestingly, we also see a lower likelihood of students having their special education
identification removed if they won a lottery to attend their first choice school. As none of the
results in Table 15 are statistically significant, we cannot conclude with confidence that an LSP
scholarship award affected the identification or de-identification of students with disabilities.

Appendix Table 1: Cox hazard ratios for the likelihood of identification and de-identification for
special education, lotteried sample

Identification
Observations
De-Identification
Observations
Demographics
Total Choices
NOLA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.531*
(0.195)

1.313
(0.590)

1.400
(0.579)

1.373
(0.601)

2,570
1.822***
(0.356)

2,570
0.925
(0.242)

2,570
0.855
(0.201)

2,570
0.856
(0.190)

353

353
X

353
X
X

353
X
X
X

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures are standardized within test type and grade based on the score
distributions of members of the control group. All models control for modified assessment. Standard
errors (presented in parentheses) account for nesting of observations at in lottery risk sets. Excluded
comparison group is African American students.
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Conclusion
Financial incentives are powerful when considering identification and de-identification in
special education. Even successful policies can have incentives that intend to invoke one
behavior while simultaneously inducing another behavior. Policy makers, in their attempts to
improve education in the United States, sometimes develop policies that overlook the issues
concerning students with disabilities. Students in special education make up just over 10 percent
of students in schools. This small constituency within the K-12 education policy sphere wields
federal, state, and local funds required to uphold the individual entitlement to a free and
appropriate education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).
The regulations surrounding special education are mandates with few subtle incentives. The
purpose of IDEA and special education is to ensure that students with disabilities are educated
alongside their non-disabled peers to the maximum extent possible for them to still receive
FAPE. Placing the label of “special education” on a student can have a multitude of unintended
consequences despite having the intention of adequately educating a student.
Special education may bring positive academic affects (Hanushek, Kain., & Rivkin,
2002), but it can also bring with it the stigma of low expectations (Shifrer, 2013) and bullying of
the student with a disability. Furthermore, millions of dollars go into supporting special
education programs. For these reasons, it is important that educational policies do not create
perverse incentives to identify or mislabel students as needing special education services when
they do not or vice versa. The purpose of these three studies is to further the literature regarding
educational policies that may influence the decision making process around special education
eligibility.
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Special education has long been seen as an incentive for schools to identify students.
Prior research analyzed how state finance formula changes in the 1990’s were associated with
special education enrollment changes (Cullen, 2003; Dhuey & Lipscomb, 2011; Greene &
Forster, 2002; Mahitivanichcha and Parrish, 2005). Like these studies, the current research using
an event study framework to analyze data that continues until 2013 finds similar results. The
most aggregate analyses appear to be sensitive to the categorization of at least one state, but
disaggregated results appear to be in line with economic theory. Capitation based funding
formulas that do not allocate funding for each additional student in special education, but cap
funding based on a state average special education enrollment, appear to decrease the number of
students with non-severe disabilities. In particular, students with specific learning disabilities
saw just under a one percentage point decrease after becoming a capitation funding system from
a prospective system. This seems to also result in a change in the distribution of students with
disabilities. We see this in an increase in students with severe and non-severe disabilities in less
inclusive setting, signaling that there is a higher proportion of students in special education with
higher needs.
Another important contribution of this line of research is preliminary evidence that there
is a correlation between the implementation of a special education private school voucher
program and special education enrollment. States that implement a private school voucher see
an increase in the percent of students identified as have a specific learning disability and small
marginally significant decrease in the percent of students with intellectual disabilities.
Moreover, students with both severe and non-severe disabilities experienced a decrease in public
special day school placements, with a decrease for students with severe disabilities in the
aggregated percent educated outside of a regular school. This rise in specific learning disabilities
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should be explored further to determine whether these identifications are a means of students
obtaining a voucher and leaving the public school system. Given the reduction in students
educated in public special day schools once a voucher program exists indicates that these may be
students who are more likely to use a voucher in order to choose a private day school option
rather than public. It may also demonstrate that students with higher needs, even within disability
categories, are utilizing private school vouchers. It is also important that future research
analyzes the characteristics of different private school choice programs and how these policies
can be designed to encourage the most participation by students without resulting in a push for
unnecessary identification.
The studies by both Greene and Forster (2002) and Dhuey and Lispcomb (2011) that
analyze special education finance formula impacts on special education enrollment also attempt
to determine whether accountability systems similarly induce perverse incentives to identify
students as needing special education. Neither of these studies, nor Hanushek and Raymond
(2005), find evidence that this occurs despite Figlio and Getzler’s (2002) research on the same
topic. Important for policy development is the difference in the ability for students with
disabilities to opt-out of testing regimes. Figlio and Getzler analyzed data in Florida during a
time in which students with specific disabilities were exempt from testing. No Child Left Behind
(NCLB) and IDEA, which was reauthorized in 2004, close on the heels of NCLB, only allowed
for a very small portion of the special education population to receive exemptions. This is
important when considering a policy, as we do in our study on minimum subgroups, that can
enable schools to avoid being held accountability under specific circumstances. In the example
of subgroups under NCLB, the size of these subgroups were determined at the state-level to
maximize both the number of schools held accountable and the statistical reliability of estimates
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of a given sample. Schools with a special education population that hovered around the
minimum subgroup mark could have an incentive to avoid accountability for this subgroup.
In alignment with these incentives, our research finds that in the year after a school falls
below the minimum subgroup size for special education students to be accountable under NCLB,
there is a decrease in the percent of students with disabilities enrolled in the school. Further
confirming our hypothesis, schools that are closest to the cutoff see the largest declines. These
behaviors are not surprising given that the majority of schools that included students with
disabilities in their calculation of AYP were unable to meet their annual goals (Harr-Robins et al,
2013). If schools do not believe that they can successfully move students with disabilities to a
level of proficiency at a given rate, then they have a great incentive to under-identify them to
avoid sanctions. Including students with disabilities in accountability systems is essential for
ensuring schools are adequately educating them. Expecting those students to progress at an
identical pace to their non-disabled peers, however, is unrealistic, resulting in attempts to game
the system. The consequence of this is twofold. One, students who may need special education
services are not provided them. Two, schools that should be held accountable for their ability to
educate students with disabilities are not. Both the policies of minimum subgroup size and
obtainable annual measurable goals must be reevaluated to ensure neither services nor
accountability are denied.
In the midst of policies that directly aim to alter incentives in public schools, school
choice became an important policy consideration. Students with disabilities have continued to be
a portion of the discussion when discussing school choice. Charter schooling has taken the brunt
of criticism regarding possible discriminatory practices to deter the enrollment of students with
disabilities. Private school choice programs directly targeting students with disabilities have
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quietly sprung up in large numbers over the last 20 years. We only know the first inklings of
how students with disabilities experience school choice. Researchers have started using
enrollment data more frequently to at least address issues of possible discrimination in charter
schools, and our research is the first to experimentally estimate this topic for a private school
choice program. Unlike charter schools, private schools have very little incentive to identify new
students or maintain old labels for special education. The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP)
gives private schools a very small window to access supplemental special education funds, but
this is not likely a good inducement to identify new students.
Despite only having vague evidence over the course of the LSP’s first three years, it is
clear that over the course of the program, private schools attempt to achieve an equilibrium in
special education identifications. In the first years, private schools seem to remove labels at very
higher rates and identify students at lower rates than the public schools. Whether these trends
occur due to school mission, academic interventions, or parental choice, the process of
identifying students for special education is certainly not equivalent across schooling sectors.
This is an essential aspect of school choice that researchers and policy makers have to consider
when analyzing data and attempting to determine what is best for students. Since it is not clear
that the LSP is beneficial for students (Mills & Wolf, 2017), the quality of the educational
experience is likely a more important policy consideration than the special education label of a
student.
It is the job of the American school system to give every student an equal opportunity to
learn. Special education is the mechanism that exists to support do so for students with
disabilities. Determining who has a disability is not always a simple process when it is not
clearly visible. We rely on teams of people with various perspectives to made decisions about
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which students truly need services and which do not. These perspectives can be altered by
policies, intentionally or unintentionally. The purpose of the current line of research is to
investigate how policies make people behave in the special education decision making process.
Policies will never be flawless, but they should take into account this at-risk group of students
however small they may be.
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